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“PIGS IN THE PARLOR”: THE LEGACY OF RACIAL ZONING AND THE
CHALLENGE OF AFFIRMATIVELY FURTHERING FAIR HOUSING IN THE
SOUTH
Jade A. Craig*
The Fair Housing Act of 1968 includes a provision that requires that the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) administer the
policies within the Act to “affirmatively further” fair housing. Scholars
have largely derived their analysis from studying large urban areas and
struggles to integrate the suburbs. The literature, however, has not focused
on the impact of zoning and discriminatory land use policies within and
around low-income rural and small communities or specifically in the
southeastern United States. Scholars have also insufficiently considered
the implications of these policies on the duty to “affirmatively further” fair
housing.
Racial zoning was the preferred method of establishing residential
segregation in the South in the early 20th century until the U.S. Supreme
Court formally struck it down in 1917. This Article argues that racial
zoning should be considered a logic and a metaphor rather than simply a
historical moment in land use policy that has passed. The logic of racial
zoning typifies anti-black land use policies that confine African Americans
to particular areas, and this confinement facilitates the degradation of
these areas. This Article contends that the logic of racial zoning creates
black residential spaces and inscribes them with features that seek to
render them undesirable. This process entrenches residential segregation
by driving non-black residents away, just as rendering white space as
desirable and exclusive protects housing inequity. The Article explicates
the history of the racial zoning movement and the court cases that led to its
demise. These cases, however, left the logic of racial zoning largely
untouched. It then examines the legacy of racial zoning through three
phenomena: (1) the designating of locations for black communities; (2) the
lack of protective zoning given to black residential areas; and (3) the
*
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disproportionate siting of LULUs in these areas. Finally, it asks whether
the federal Fair Housing Act can remediate this legacy through policy or
litigation. The Article argues that fair housing litigation has had limited
success in undoing discrimination in land use protections that characterize
the legacy of racial zoning. Instead, HUD’s AFFH Rule may have a great
impact in challenging jurisdictions to tackle community development issues
in the context of fair housing. Its success in the South, however, is limited
because its oversight mechanisms often overlook smaller, rural
communities where anti-black land use policies and segregation patterns
remain in place. Ultimately, fair housing in the South is not just about
access to housing itself, but also about changing the context around it.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co.,1 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that zoning was constitutional and fell within a local
government’s traditional police power. Justice Sutherland, writing for the
majority, described zoning as a mechanism to control “the right thing in the
wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.” 2 This Article
suggests that, within this metaphor, land use law has often regarded African
Americans in particular as proverbial “pigs.” African Americans were,
metaphorically, “right things.” Efforts to remove black people and their
racialized cultural practices have avoided the presumption that black people
do not have a right to exist. Indeed, the earliest cases in which white
plaintiffs in southern and border U.S. states attempted to enjoin or remove
blackness from their presence under the common law doctrine of nuisance
generally failed.3 Even today, in the firestorm of incidents known by the
online handle #LivingWhileBlack, in which white individuals have enlisted
law enforcement to remove blacks from their presence, the claim is
generally not that the black individual is taking up space in a place where
he does not have a legal right to be.4 Instead, they are “the right thing[s] in
the wrong place[s].”5
The racial zoning movement that began in early twentieth century
America sought to place blacks “in the barnyard and out of the living
room.”6 It was the South’s version of “institutionalizing the common law

1

272 U.S. 365 (1926).
Id. at 388.
3
See Rachel D. Godsil, Race Nuisance: The Politics of Law in the Jim Crow
Era, 105 MICH. L. REV. 505, 505 (2006).
4
Taja-Nia Y. Henderson & Jamila Jefferson-Jones note that “[w]hile several of
the highly-publicized #LivingWhileBlack cases involve attempts to regulate Black
occupancy in private space, [they] were unable to identify a single publicized instance in
which the target of the law enforcement call lacked a legal right to occupy said space. []
In other words, while callers may have believed that they were ‘securing’ space by limiting
access by trespassers, in each case [they] have identified, the target of the call had a right
to be present.” Taja-Nia Y. Henderson & Jamila Jefferson-Jones, #LivingWhileBlack:
Blackness as Nuisance, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 863, 870 n.29 (2020) (footnotes omitted).
5
See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388; see also id. (noting that while people in publicized
#LivingWhileBlack cases attempted to regulate blacks’ presence in private space, they
were purportedly “‘securing’ space by limiting access by trespassers” rather than claiming
that the black individual targeted did not have “a right to be present”).
6
See Charles Harr, Preface, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM: PROMISES
STILL TO KEEP x (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989) [hereinafter ZONING
AND THE AMERICAN DREAM] (“By institutionalizing the common law of nuisance, zoning
has kept Euclid author Justice Sutherland’s pig in the barnyard and out of the living
room.”).
2
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of nuisance.”7 The problem, however, is that African Americans are not
pigs; they are people. 8 Under the logic of racial segregation, however,
African Americans were treated as “subpersons,” and zoning law governed
them according to this cruel designation. 9 Racial zoning designated land
for occupancy by black residents to the exclusion of occupancy anywhere
outside of these defined areas in a given town or city. These areas became
the “barnyards” to which cities relegated African Americans while
traditional single-family, single-use residential districts—the “parlors” of
both a racial zoning ordinance and the general zoning ordinances that
followed—were reserved for wealthy or upper class whites.
City officials were indeed not good stewards of these barnyards.
They often selected locations for black residential districts in the least
desirable parts of urban areas. They provided these areas with the least
amount of protection from commercial and industrial uses that were
7

See id.
This underlying view of African Americans as non-persons comes across in
the way that audiences responded to Lorraine Hansberry’s groundbreaking play, A Raisin
in the Sun. Multiple interviewers asked Hansberry to comment on the consistent refrain
that the play was “not a Negro play at all, but a play about people.” She consistently had
to clarify this “misstatement” and explain that “Negroes” are people. See Mollie Godfrey,
Conversations with Lorraine Hansberry, BOOKFORUM (Dec. 29, 2020),
https://www.bookforum.com/culture/the-playwright-s-pan-african-sensibility-in-herown-words-24317 (noting that Hansberry would explain “that her play was both ‘a play
about people’ and ‘a play about Negroes,’ and to ‘get to the universal you must pay very
great attention to the specific’). Ironically, A Raisin in the Sun addresses housing
discrimination and the ways in which it affects African Americans’ sense of personhood
and their access to opportunity. See LORRAINE HANSBERRY, A RAISIN IN THE SUN: A
DRAMA IN THREE ACTS (1959).
9
Philosopher Charles W. Mills develops this theory of the construction of
nonwhites as “subpersons” under the Racial Contract, which he argues should replace the
prevailing theory of the “social contract” as a realistic account of the structure of white
settler colonial and post-colonial societies. See CHARLES W. MILLS, THE RACIAL
CONTRACT (1997). Mills defines the Racial Contract this way:
8

The Racial Contract is that set of formal or informal agreements or metaagreements . . . between the members of one subset of humans,
henceforth designated as [“white”], and coextensive . . . with the class of
full persons, to categorize the remaining subset of humans as “nonwhite”
and of a different and inferior moral status, subpersons, so that they have
a subordinate civil standing in the white or white-ruled polities the whites
either already inhabit or establish or in transactions as aliens with these
polities . . . . [T]he purpose of the Contract is always the differential
privileging of the whites as a group with respect to the nonwhites as a
group, the exploitation of their bodies, land, and resources, and the denial
of equal socioeconomic opportunities to them.
Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
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inconsistent with a residential community. They then took advantage of the
spatial segregation to locate locally undesirable land uses (“LULUs”) in
and around these communities. Over decades, these factors threatened to
turn these communities into metaphorical pigsties—over the constant
resistance of black residents who built their lives in them.
This Article argues that these practices serve to attach a racialized
identity to space and render it “black” space. John Dubin has explicated
the practice of failing to use zoning laws to protect black communities from
harmful commercial and industrial uses.10 Likewise, urban planning
scholar Yale Rabin has characterized the practice of disproportionately
filling areas in and around majority black communities with undesirable
land uses as “expulsive zoning.”11 While the literature has often focused
on efforts to maintain white spatial exclusivity and the privileging of white
space,12 the process of inscribing black residential areas with features that
seek to render them undesirable spaces of disadvantage has received less
attention. Just as city leaders selected locations for white communities in
the most desirable sections of a city and used land use law to protect from
undesirable land uses, they often assigned African Americans to the least
desirable areas of town. They refused to protect black communities with
zoning laws and made them available to host undesirable but necessary
local land uses like landfills and factories, over and above their fair share
and to the benefit of white communities.
The legacy of racial zoning is not merely a past-to-present link
limited to those cities that once had racial zoning ordinances and the
geography of segregation just in those cities today. Rather, the true legacy
of racial zoning is two-fold. First, it is the logic that informed the reasons
for their initial adoption and the ways in which this logic carried over into
how cities implemented and enforced (or refused to enforce) general zoning
ordinances after explicit racial zoning became impermissible. Second,
racial zoning is a metaphor. One might think of today’s hypersegregated
majority-black communities (or communities of color more broadly) as
areas that local governments have approached with a racial zoning logic.
In other words, these neighborhoods have been “racially zoned” simply by
10
Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrification: Explicating a Right to
Protective Zoning in Low-Income Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L. REV. 739, 742
(1993); see also Swati Prakash, Comment, Racial Dimensions of Property Value
Protection Under the Fair Housing Act, 101 CAL. L. REV. 1437 (2013).
11
Yale Rabin, Expulsive Zoning: The Inequitable Legacy of Euclid, in ZONING
AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 103 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989).
12
See, e.g., Elise C. Boddie, Racial Territoriality, 58 UCLA L. REV. 401 (2010);
Henderson & Jefferson-Jones, supra note 4, at 905; Rachel D. Godsil, Viewing the
Cathedral from Behind the Color Line: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Environmental
Racism, 53 EMORY L.J. 1807 (2004).
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another name13 as a result of the enforcement or lack thereof of the
traditional zoning regime.
This Article focuses on the South, where racial zoning became the
predominant method for ensuring racial segregation in housing and
excluding African Americans from white communities.14 It is important to
examine this region more closely for several reasons. Social scientists have
acknowledged that racial segregation in housing that revolves around which
groups live on high ground or low-lying areas likely takes place across the
United States.15 The South is unique, however, because of its history of
slavery, the high population of African Americans, and the fraught political
climate which is heavily polarized along racial lines. 16 Small towns and
rural areas are also spaces that generally escape close study in fair housing
legal scholarship.17 While the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the practice
of racial zoning in 1917 in Buchanan v. Warley,18 the practice continued for
many decades thereafter either directly or in thinly veiled forms at least in
part because of the “historical durability and unique character of southern
race relationships.”19

This frame is not unlike the term “slavery by another name” that historian
Douglas Blackmon used to describe the transition from slavery to convict leasing, in which
black Americans in the South were arrested, wrongfully convicted of crimes, and sent to
labor camps or to work on so-called contracts that they were forbidden to terminate for
white landowners. See DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE REENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II (2008).
14
See Deborah N. Archer, “White Men's Roads Through Black Men’s Homes”:
Advancing Racial Equity Through Highway Reconstruction, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1281
(2020) (describing the role of “the racial zoning laws that were rampant in the South” in
building highways that served as racial boundary lines); DORCETA E. TAYLOR, TOXIC
COMMUNITIES: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION, AND RESIDENTIAL
MOBILITY 152 (2014) (noting that “Southern cities were the first to enact anti-Black zoning
ordinances” and that “[a]round the time municipalities in the North were developing and
passing zoning laws to protect property values and the aesthetic appeal of neighborhoods,
southern city councils began passing ordinances to test their effectiveness at enforcing
racial segregation”); Dubin, supra note 10, at 744 (“[W]hen legally enforced segregation
approached its zenith, several southern and border cities enacted strict racial-zoning
ordinances designating separate residential districts for whites and blacks.”) (footnote
omitted).
15
See Jeff Ueland & Barney Warf, Racialized Topographies: Altitude and Race
in Southern Cities, 96 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 50, 53 (2006).
16
Id.
17
See Desiree C. Hensley, Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing in the Deep
South: Obama’s AFFH Rule Won’t Make Rural America Less Segregated, 26 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 92, 94 (2019) (noting that “fair housing legal scholarship focuses on urban,
residential segregation”).
18
245 U.S. 60 (1917).
19
Ueland & Warf, supra note 15.
13
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This Article treats racial zoning as more than a tragic moment in
time that ended with the court decisions striking it down. Instead, it
examines the legacy of racial zoning. This legacy includes the blueprint for
racial segregation that these ordinances created and the segregated living
patterns that remain as a result. It also includes the groundwork that these
ordinances laid which informed land use policy toward black communities
going forward even after high courts formally stripped local governments
of the authority to pass such ordinances.
This focus on the South is important because space and racial
hierarchy often interacted differently in this region than they did in other
parts of the country. A twentieth century African American saying
encapsulates the difference: “The South doesn’t care how close a Negro
gets, just so he doesn’t get too high; the North doesn’t care how high he
gets, just so he doesn’t get too close.” 20 This folk wisdom draws on the
experience of African American migrants who left racially zoned towns to
find freedom in the North during the Great Migration and civil rights
leaders who took the Southern organizing campaign northward. For
northern U.S. cities, geographic separation between the races played a
crucial role in excluding African Americans from the institutional forms of
power and resources amassed by whites in majority-white areas. By
contrast, African Americans and whites in the South historically lived in
close proximity to one another.21 Thus, the early efforts at establishing
white supremacy and racial hierarchy began by designating space for
blacks, sometimes with only railroad tracks as barriers (rather than the long
highways that emerged shortly after the second wave of the Great Migration
to the North).22 This restricted space became the site of multiple markers
20
See Matthew Desmond, Where Have All the Rioters Gone?, THE ATLANTIC
(Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/02/matthewdesmond-riots/552542/; see also How Mayor Daley Outfoxed Martin Luther King, NBC 5
CHICAGO
(updated
Jan.
16,
2012,
10:00
AM),
https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/how-mayor-daley-outfoxed-martin-lutherking/1902225/ (“During the Civil Rights Movement, black leaders had a saying: ‘In the
South, the white man doesn’t care how close you get, as long as you don’t get too high. In
the North, he doesn’t care how high you get, as long as you don’t get too close.’”).
21
See, e.g., Anthony Chase, In the Jungle of Cities, 84 MICH. L. REV. 737, 755
n.46 (1986) (book review) (noting “the unusual proximity of very wealthy whites and very
poor blacks in some parts of residential Miami” and history of “racially mixed
neighborhood patterns”); David D. Troutt, Katrina’s Window: Localism, Resegregation,
and Equitable Regionalism, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1109, 1117 (2008) (noting that “‘blacks’ and
‘whites’ lived in much greater proximity to each other in the city for a longer period of
time than in most American cities”).
22
See, e.g., Baker v. City of Kissimmee, Fla., 645 F. Supp. 571, 574-75 (M.D.
Fla. 1986) (describing the history of segregation along the lines provided by railroad tracks
and noting that “[t]he City's largest black residential community is primarily located
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of inferiority that reinforced the deprivation of access to institutions and
resources allotted to whites under Jim Crow. This Articles focuses on three:
(1) the location of black communities in the least desirable areas; (2) the
refusal to provide protective zoning; and (3) the disproportionate siting of
LULUs in or near African American neighborhoods.
Part II explicates the rise of the racial zoning movement and the
court cases that led to its demise. The reasoning in these decisions
establishes that racial justice was rarely even a consideration at all, much
less a primary consideration, in striking down racial zoning ordinances.
Courts instead focused on the unconstitutional limits placed on the transfer
of private property between persons. Thus, the cases left the door open for
jurisdictions to apply general zoning ordinances, which the Court upheld in
Euclid, to achieve the segregative and racist objectives of the original racial
zoning ordinances.
Part III examines the legacy of racial zoning through three
phenomena: (1) the designating of locations for black communities; (2) the
lack of protective zoning given to black residential areas; and (3) the
disproportionate siting of LULUs in these areas. In each case, a barely
broken line of racist policy decisions starts from racial zoning and continue
to impact communities today. These repercussions go unaddressed in the
focus on individual acts of housing discrimination under federal and state
fair housing laws and debates about the construction of affordable housing.
The legacy of racial zoning calls into question the focus on discrimination
in access to housing rather than discrimination in remedying the quality and
character of the community in which housing in majority-black
communities is located. These phenomena are housing problems, not
merely land use problems.
Finally, Part IV examines whether the federal Fair Housing Act
(FHA) can remediate this legacy through policy or litigation. In other
words, can the FHA treat these issues as housing law issues? The Article
argues that the case law involving challenges to the discriminatory
provision of municipal services under the Act exposes how courts narrowly
confine the relationship between housing and its relationship to the
discriminatory zoning and land use policies that characterize the legacy of
racial zoning. I join the ranks of scholars who propose litigation strategies
that attempt to broaden the reach of the FHA, but highlight the challenge
that the precedent poses for the issues arising from the logic of racial zoning
that still governs black residential areas today.

literally ‘on the other side of the railroad tracks’”); HORTENSE POWDERMAKER, AFTER
FREEDOM: A CULTURAL STUDY IN THE DEEP SOUTH (1939) (describing separation of
Mississippi town with the black section described as “Across the Tracks”).
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In light of these challenges, I turn toward the provision of the FHA
which requires all recipients of federal funding to “affirmatively further”
the goals of the FHA (“AFFH” or “affirmatively further fair housing”) and
the opportunities that it presents to engage with these limitations. I also
examine the rule implementing the AFFH mandate that HUD adopted in
2015. I argue that the AFFH mandate and the Rule provides a necessary
legal basis for requiring policy-based solutions to the legacy of racial
zoning in the South. The process of implementing and overseeing the Rule
in most parts of the South, however, fails to capture the contexts most in
need of reform. I propose requiring a more focused examination of the
relationship between racial and ethnic concentrations of poverty and
historic discrimination in zoning and land use policy that challenges
jurisdictions to adopt plans to use federal funding to remedy those
disparities. The legacy of racial zoning calls for examining a method for
denying equal housing opportunities to African Americans that
predominated in a certain part of the United States and how it should inform
the goals that cities set in their efforts to meet their fair housing obligations.
II. WHAT MAKES THE SOUTH UNIQUE—THE HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF
RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION IN THE SOUTH
The historic black presence in the South and the recent population
growth calls for an analysis of the differences between that region and the
rest of the nation which might have influenced residential segregation and
created barriers to fair housing.23 Large metropolitan areas in the Northeast
and the Midwest often have high rates of poverty in concentrated areas of
black residents.24 The South, however, presents a different pattern: the
smallest metropolitan areas have the highest levels of ghetto poverty and
the largest concentrations of poor people. 25 Public policy scholar Paul
Jargowsky has surmised that the difference stems from “blacks’ historical
settlement patterns driven largely by agriculture” in the South, an
explanation which takes into account regional and historical differences
among cities and relies less on current demographic and economic factors.26
Zoning and land use policies also informed these “settlement patterns” and
23
See Chris Kromm, Black Belt Power: African-Americans come back South,
change
political
landscape,
FACING
SOUTH
(Sept.
28,
2011)
https://www.facingsouth.org/2011/09/black-power-african-americans-come-back-southshake-up-southern-politics.html (“According to the U.S. Census, the South’s share of the
black population – 57 percent – is now the highest it’s been since 1960.”).
24
See PAUL A. JARGOWSKY, POVERTY AND PLACE: GHETTOS, BARRIOS, AND THE
AMERICAN CITY 76-77 (1997).
25
Id.
26
Id.
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contributed to racialized poverty in small and mid-sized metropolitan areas.
The construction of residential segregation in the South specifically relied
heavily on land use law in the service of this effort.
A. The Development of Segregation in the South After the Civil War
After the Civil War, segregation occurred mainly through a series
of customs and living patterns. 27 Many urban communities in the South
were fairly integrated and did not have strict patterns of racial separation. 28
These patterns arguably mirrored life on plantations during the antebellum
period; a white landowning family resided in the main house, but was
constantly attended by slaves, often known as “house slaves.” 29 By the
same token, slaves lived in separate sections of the plantation, or “slave
quarters,” but these spaces were not forbidden to whites.30 This
intermingling, with a constant attention to hierarchy certainly on the part of
slaves, was a longstanding feature of interracial relations in the South.
The end of Reconstruction led to profound social upheaval as white
Southerners returned to power at the same time that the number of African
Americans migrating from rural to urban areas in the South increased
significantly.31 Black populations in major Southern cities rose by ten to
fifteen percent from 1860 to 1910. 32 In 1860, only three Southern cities—
Jacksonville, Florida; Norfolk, Virginia; and Richmond, Virginia—had a

27

Roger L. Rice, Residential Segregation by Law, 1910-1917, 34 J. S. HIST. 179,
179 (1968) (“Segregation by law, however, had been a somewhat less constant fact of life
for Negroes immediately after the Civil War.”).
28
See, e.g., JOHN H. BRACEY, JR., ET AL., THE RISE OF THE GHETTO (1971).
29
See Nicholas Boston, The Slave Experience: Living Conditions, THIRTEEN,
https://www.thirteen.org/wnet/slavery/experience/living/history2.html (last visited June
15, 2022).
30
See SOLOMON NORTHUP, TWELVE YEARS A SLAVE (1853) (describing white
slave owners’ visits to slave quarters by slave owners to commit rape and appearance of
poor whites in slave quarters); Robert Jones, Jr., THE PROPHETS (2021) (describing visits
to slave quarters by white landowners).
31
See TAYLOR, supra note 14, at 152-53 (describing the migration of African
Americans from rural to urban areas of the South after the Civil War, a trend which
precipitated the passage of anti-black racial-zoning ordinances); Christopher Silver, The
Racial Origins of Zoning in American Cities, in URBAN PLANNING AND THE AFRICAN
AMERICAN COMMUNITY: IN THE SHADOWS 25 (June Manning Thomas & Marsha Ritzdorf
eds., 1997); RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW
OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 41-44 (2017) (arguing that Southern cities
enacted racial zoning ordinances because they already had large populations of black
residents that they could not expel, unlike small towns in the Midwest and West that were
driving out their African American residents from the 1890s through the 1930s)
32
See TAYLOR, supra note 14, at 153-54.
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black population that exceeded twenty-five percent.33 By 1910, that
number of cities had risen to ten. 34 The increase in the number of black
residents alarmed whites in these cities. 35 A race riot broke out in Atlanta
in 1906.36 Several race riots and massacres of African American residents
also broke out across the South in 1917 and 1921, including in Houston,
Texas; Winston-Salem, North Carolina; Washington, D.C.; and Tulsa,
Oklahoma.37 By 1915, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky justified
Louisville’s racial zoning ordinance by pointing to the “gravity of the race
problem as it exists in our country to-day” and “congested municipal
conditions.”38 The interest of preventing racial conflict likewise shows up
in other cases upholding racial zoning ordinances. 39
White rage forged the development of segregation in fire.
Alongside repression, segregationists also maintained racial hierarchy
through exclusion. Under Jim Crow, the “assignment of legal meaning to
determinable segments of the physical world . . . was often experienced as
exclusion or denial.”40 Segregationists communicated this message in a
variety of ways, including directly denying blacks certain facilities. 41 It
began with the designation of certain spaces with racial identities, assigning
white space and black space. These assignments developed to entail the

33

Id.
Id.
35
Id. at 153.
36
Id.
37
Id.
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duplication of spaces or the denial of access entirely.42 In whatever way it
was performed, “segregation entailed exclusion from white spaces.” 43
1. Background Conceptions of Blacks as Nuisances
“The idea of Black people being ‘bothersome,’ ‘vexing,’
‘annoying,’ or ‘harmful’ to white people is one that has circulated since the
antebellum period and has persisted well after.”44 Nuisance law, which was
very elastic in early twentieth century America, became a predictable tool
for eradicating the presence of black people in white neighborhoods. 45
Treatises described twenty-eight cases dating back to the late nineteenth
century in which white plaintiffs brought cases arguing that courts should
ban or remove their black neighbors as a matter of tort law under the
nuisance doctrine; the majority of them were brought in the South. 46
The legal definition of nuisance differs from the way in which
people often understand the term socially. 47 Nonetheless, the social
42

Frances L. Edwards & Grayson Bennett Thompson, AIA, The Legal Creation
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Laws, 12 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 145, 153 (2010) (noting that courts often
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children, to enforce the doctrine of separate but equal) (citing Tucker v. Blease, 81 S.E.
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Negroes with Reference to Pullman Cars, 28 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419 (1915) (arguing that
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passengers may constitute a deprivation of property without due process of law); Rachel
F. Moran, Diversity, Distance, and the Delivery of Higher Education, 59 OHIO ST. L.J.
775, 777 (1998) (observing that “[t]he investment in well-appointed residential campuses
for white students, who then enjoyed access to distinguished faculty and a network of
successful alumni, could not be duplicated for blacks in separate institutions” exemplified
how “segregation both reflected and reinforced racial stratification”).
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DELANEY, supra note 40, at 96-97.
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Lolita Buckner Inniss, Race, Space, and Surveillance: A Response to
#LivingWhileBlack: Blackness As Nuisance, 69 AM. U.L. REV. F. 213, 220-21 (2020)
(footnote omitted).
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Godsil, supra note 3, at 514.
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See id. at 506-07 (“Most of these ‘race-nuisance’ cases were brought in the
South, including Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, and Tennessee, but a few were brought in
the North as well.”). Interestingly, however, “the white plaintiffs lost” in most of these
cases—a pattern that “casts substantial doubt on the background assumptions about the
way law worked during the Jim Crow era, and thus provides a more textured understanding
of that period.” Id. at 505, 507.
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Inniss, supra note 44, at 219 (noting that “the word ‘nuisance’ has a significant
non-legal valence that often colors the way in which it is understood in legal decisions.
Nuisance in the lay sense refers to a person, thing, or circumstance that causes harm or
injury or is unpleasant, obnoxious, or annoying”).
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definition relates to the legal context, as the non-legal meaning of a term
informs the way in which legal actors analyze and apply the law. 48 This
distinction is significant in the context of racial zoning as one considers that
it is local government officials like city council members, executives, and
planners—not necessarily lawyers or judges—who develop and enforce
zoning ordinances and maps. These actors have a legal function, but their
application of the law is not as technical as that of a court. As the use of
nuisance law for managing incompatible land uses receded from the
background in the wake of local governments’ adoption of zoning
ordinances, the underlying nuisance framework never truly disappeared. 49
2. Race and the “Progressive Era”
As the country transitioned from the Gilded Age and into the
Progressive Era during the first two decades of the twentieth century, “the
popular horror of racial amalgamation reached its apogee.”50 Consistent
with the political zeitgeist of the time, local government officials supported
“social planning,” and many in the South sought to extend the reach of
government to implement “broader methods of social control than mere
antimiscegenation statutes.”51
This history provides the logical underpinning for the development
of zoning ordinance as a method of instantiating racial hierarchy. During
the same period, local governments also began to focus on preventing land
use conflicts from taking place, replacing the resort to the common law
doctrine of nuisance with proactive methods of policing land uses.52 Local
governments sought both the power “to eliminate negative dangerous or
anti-social uses” and the “power affirmatively to select among admittedly
harmless uses those which the political power deems the most popular and
to prohibit all others.”53
White segregationists employed pseudoscience to support claims of
black inferiority and to defend racial segregation. 54 Whites began to
conclude that there was a need to “segregate or quarantine a race liable to
be a source of contamination and social danger to the white community, as
48
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it sank even deeper into the slough of disease, vice and criminality.” 55
Equality concerns had very little influence on lawmaking in the Jim Crow
South when it came to the interests of African Americans: “Jim Crow laws
reflected a society that felt itself under no constraint to treat blacks equally,
not even in the formal constraint of legal fiction.”56 Beginning as early as
the 1910s, as cities codified nuisance law in zoning ordinances, an
“undercurrent of ethnic prejudice and racism also ran through these efforts
to develop a more systematic approach to control urban land use.”57
“Residential segregation codified racial preferences through racial
zoning.”58 From the early years in the development of segregation, it
became clear to state actors that segregation had to go through a process
one historian has referred to as “de jurification” for the system to sustain
white supremacy and racial hierarchy.59 Segregation required a transition
from social custom into law.
III. THE RISE OF THE RACIAL ZONING MOVEMENT
The cases that involve challenges to the racial zoning movement
that took place in the South display an underlying logic that would explain
the legacies that it wrought, including the designation of the most
undesirable areas of a jurisdiction for black residency; the failure to provide
protective zoning; and the exploitation of that confinement of African
Americans to steer undesirable land uses that degraded the community’s
property values at the expense of whites. The racial zoning movement is
not a historical phase of American law that rose and fell. It is the beginning
of a policy at the foundation of how land use law treats and fails to regulate
in the interests of furthering equity in the quality of majority-black
neighborhoods.
A. Early Racial Zoning Ordinances
Racial zoning ordinances would ensure that racial exclusion and
white supremacy were written onto the land and would permanently shape
access and power in the relationship between the races. Ultimately,
“[s]egregation was constructed in order to reinforce relations of racial
55
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domination and subordination.”60 White-controlled local governments in
the South exploited land use laws to cultivate white spaces of power and to
ensure the exclusion of blacks from these spaces. Land use controls could
also craft the most ideal spatial circumstances for whites and the most
disadvantageous for blacks—an assignment process that limited black
access and structured racial inequality.
Racial zoning ordinances were one of the earliest formal land use
controls that white Southerners developed to separate the races. Urban
reformers and white politicians interested in ensuring black exclusion led a
movement in the early twentieth century to urge local governments to pass
zoning ordinances that assigned separate residential areas to whites and
blacks, beginning with Baltimore in 1910 and spreading throughout the
South and to the rest of the country.61 In many localities, racial zoning
ordinances were one of the first instruments used to legally organize
separate spaces and lives for blacks and whites.
1. Baltimore: The Beginning
The road to Baltimore, Maryland, receiving the dubious distinction
of becoming the first city to pass a residential segregation ordinance began
with conceptions of blacks as nuisances. 62 Urban reformers and whites in
Baltimore became concerned about the severe poverty and blight that they
saw developing as black migration into the city increased.63 Black poverty
had come to resemble a physical nuisance. That concern led the city not to
remedy the problem, but to avoid and exacerbate it by passing a law that
restricted blacks to particular areas in 1910.
The segregation ordinance in Baltimore also developed as a direct
response to prevent residential integration. During the summer of 1910, a
prosperous black lawyer crossed a color line in northwest Baltimore when
he moved from an affluent black section into a home in the fashionable
white neighborhood in the city.64 The move immediately provoked
agitation, and his family faced harassment. 65 White Baltimore residents,
60
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and specifically residents of the black family’s new street, held a mass
meeting on July 5, 1910.66 White residents prepared a petition requesting
that the Mayor and City Council “take some measures to restrain the
colored people from locating in a white community, and proscribe a limit
beyond which it shall be unlawful for them to go . . . .”67 A white lawyer
decided to write a law designed to meet the protesters’ demands to prevent
the so-called “Negro invasion,” and a city council member introduced the
bill.68 At the public hearings that followed, blacks were the main
protestors.69 Their challenge was to no avail; the city council passed the
bill in December 1910. 70 The Baltimore Sun summarized the ordinance’s
provisions:
That no negro can move into a block in which more than half
of the residents are white. That no white person can move
into a block in which more than half of the residents are
colored. That a violator of the law is punishable by a fine of
not more than $100 or imprisonment of from 30 days to 1
year, or both. That existing conditions shall not be
disturbed. No white person will be compelled to move away
from his house because the block in which he lives has more
negroes than whites, and no negro can be forced to move
from his house if his block has more whites than negroes.
That no section of the city is exempted from the conditions
of the ordinance. It applies to every house. 71
The final version of the ordinance also prohibited blacks from using
residences on white blocks for public assembly, and vice versa. 72
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Whites who challenged the black family’s move into “their”
neighborhood viewed blacks as a social nuisance. The pleading in the
petition could have easily been against a toxic waste facility that had made
plans to move next door. The fact that pressure for the racial zoning law
could come to a head after one black man decided to move his family into
a white neighborhood indicates the level of racial tension in the air at the
time. The protests also illustrate the degree to which residential segregation
and black exclusion were the result of specific policy choices by individuals
and state actors. The segregation ordinance became a weapon that whites
could marshal to exclude blacks, control their mobility and access to
opportunity, and further the black disempowerment that was at the heart of
white supremacy.
2. Beyond Baltimore
While the racial zoning movement eventually grew to become
national in scope, it began and had its most wide-ranging impact in the
South.73 Racial zoning ordinances spread quickly with wide approval.
Between 1910 and 1916, they were enacted in Baltimore; several cities in
Virginia; Winston-Salem, North Carolina; Greenville, North Carolina;
Atlanta; Louisville; St. Louis; Oklahoma City; and New Orleans. 74 The
ordinances were very popular: St. Louis’s ordinance, for example, was
enacted by referendum by a margin of approximately three to one.75 To be
sure, the cities applied different methods to impose complete racial
segregation in housing, including keeping each block exclusive to one race
by prohibiting anyone of a different race from entering; dividing the
municipality into distinct racial districts; or only allowing new individuals
to move to a block if they shared the race of the majority of that block’s
current residents.76 One city, New Orleans, required new residents of a
particular race to obtain the consent of the current residents if the current
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residents were of a different race.77 The objective, however, remained the
same.
Louisville would become arguably the most notable convert to the
movement to establish what one historian has called “municipal
apartheid”78 because its law led to the movement’s formal end.
3. Lessons from the Rise of the Movement
Indeed, racial zoning ordinances were somewhat of a precursor to
general zoning ordinances. Although Baltimore passed its racial zoning
ordinance in 1910, New York City did not enact the nation’s first
comprehensive zoning ordinance until six years later in 1916.79 In 1909,
Los Angeles adopted regulations that divided the city into residential and
industrial use districts, but it was not nearly as comprehensive as New York
City’s ordinance. “[T]hus, New York’s ordinance is considered the
landmark in land-use regulation.”80 To the extent that Los Angeles
developed the earliest zoning scheme, the fact that one of the first responses
to the concept was to create a system that divided cities into districts for
separate racial groups indicates the consistent link between the use of
zoning to segregate people in addition to types of land uses.
Prior to the Court’s decision in Buchanan, at least one state,
Virginia, began granting cities the power to pass racial zoning ordinances.81
For their part, several cities in the southern and border states also passed
residential segregation ordinances, without regard to whether their state
legislatures had expressly authorized them to do so.82 Several northern
cities had considered adopting residential segregation laws as well, but
instead violence became an important mechanism for enforcing racial
77
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segregation, particularly after the Court struck down racial zoning in
Buchanan.83 Legal challenges to these explicit ordinances were met with
mixed success.84 Three states’ courts that considered the question—
Georgia, Maryland, and North Carolina—held that the racial zoning laws
were unconstitutional.85 The high courts in Virginia and Kentucky held that
they were constitutional.86
The early cases reviewing racial zoning ordinances provide insight
into why discriminatory land use policies based on racial zones remained
in place long after the ordinances were struck down. First, the courts almost
universally did not question the legality or morality of anti-black
segregation in principle, likely a function of deciding the cases in the world
after Plessy v. Ferguson,87 in which the U.S. Supreme Court approved
segregation itself in the doctrine of “separate but equal.” In State v.
Gurry,88 the earliest case arising from a challenge to a racial zoning
ordinance in the South, there was no question that segregation was legal.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the city government of
Baltimore had the authority under its police powers “for the segregation of
the white and colored races” without conflicting with the federal or state
constitutions.89 It refused to uphold the ordinance, however, because it
failed to protect individuals who may have acquired a legal right to reside
in a property at the time the city adopted the ordinance. 90 Even the North
Carolina court in State v. Darnell, which gave the most full-throated
condemnation that connected the ordinance to other forms of discrimination
in striking it down, ruled that “[t]here is no question that legislation can
control social rights by forbidding intermarriage of the races, and in
requiring Jim Crow cars, and in similar matters.” 91 Other courts that upheld
racial zoning ordinances also approved the validity of segregation.92
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When one court approached the question of whether the ordinance
violated the Fourteenth Amendment, it took a very limited approach to
interpreting the amendment.93 The court reasoned that the amendment
prohibited taking action that infringed upon the rights of “citizen[s] of the
United States,” but not citizens of their own state, relying on the cases that
narrowed the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment, including the Slaughter
House Cases.94 The decline of the Fourteenth Amendment’s importance in
jurisprudence led to the elevation of explicitly racist policies like racial
zoning without questioning their moral legitimacy.
Both the reach of a local government’s police power and the limits
on a city’s ability to interfere with residents’ property rights informed how
the courts interpreted the problems with the racial zoning ordinances before
them. Richard Thompson Ford illuminated “two contradictory conceptions
of local political space” with which these courts struggled in their decisions:
one that “regards local jurisdictions as geographically defined delegates of
centralized power, administrative conveniences without autonomous
political significance,” while “[t]he other treats local jurisdictions as
autonomous entities that deserve deference because they are manifestations
of an unmediated democratic sovereignty.”95 According to Ford, “[t]he first
account avoids examination of the potentially segregated character of local
jurisdictions by denying them any legal significance; the second, by
reference to their democratic origins, or by tacit analogy to private property
rights, or both.”96 In both accounts, courts find a basis to ignore the legal
implications of racial segregation and inequality.
The court in State v. Darnell97 considered the state legislature’s
authority to limit the powers of cities with respect to the laws that they could
enact. It held that the Winston, North Carolina, racial zoning ordinance
expanded the power to regulate for the “general welfare” to an “extended
and wholly unrestricted scope which we do not think the Legislature could
have contemplated in using those words,” particularly because the
ordinance “establishe[d] a public policy which ha[d] hitherto been

endangered by the residence of white and colored people in close proximity to one
another.’” Id. at 144 (quoting Va. Acts 1912, p. 330).
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unknown in the legislation of our state.” 98 Other states, however, granted
broad discretion to local governments to make these prohibitions.99 The
court in Darnell essentially took the position that the ordinance was wrong
because it extended beyond the city of Winston’s delegated “centralized
power,” under Ford’s framing. 100 It viewed the ordinance, however, as an
overextension of the city’s police powers and not a problem of race
discrimination.101
The effect of racial zoning ordinances on private property rights also
did not escape the courts that followed State v. Gurry. In nearly every case
involving a challenge to a racial zoning ordinance during the movement’s
early years, courts emphasized the primacy of property rights and ruled that
the racial zoning ordinance at issue should be overturned because the
ordinance infringed on these rights.102 The courts also refused to apply the
ordinance to deprive a property owner who had a right of occupancy at the
time the jurisdiction passed the ordinance. 103 The reasoning of the cases
that strike down these ordinances and their focus on property rights and not
on the moral depravity of racism exemplify Derrick Bell’s assessment of
the role of race in the courts during the Jim Crow era: “The courts, and
along with them the rule of law, became not impartial arbiters of societal
relations but instead the mirror and enforcer of property interests.”104
The Kentucky Court of Appeals, however, was an important
exception, as it expressed a willingness to sacrifice time-honored doctrines
of property ownership in favor of state regulation of land—in this case, one
that furthered the interests of rigid racial segregation and white
supremacy.105 It found that a property owner’s nearly absolute right to
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dispose of his property as the owner saw fit had “little place in modern
jurisprudence.”106 Instead, it reasoned:
The advance of civilization and the consequent extension of
governmental activities along lines having their objective in
better living conditions, saner social conditions, and a higher
standard of human character has resulted in a gradual
lessening of the dominion of the individual over private
property and a corresponding strengthening of the regulative
power of the state in respect thereof, so that to-day all private
property is held subject to the unchallenged right and power
of the state to impose upon the use and enjoyment thereof
such reasonable regulations as are deemed expedient for the
public welfare.107
For one court at least, the dangers of state-imposed segregation that
the racial zoning ordinances represented were apparent and served as a basis
to overturn them.108 In Darnell, the North Carolina Supreme Court took
seriously the slippery slope that the ordinance implied:
If the board of aldermen is thereby authorized to make this
restriction, a bare majority of the board could, if they may
“deem it wise and proper,” require Republicans to live on
certain streets, and Democrats on others, or that Protestants
shall reside only in certain parts of the town, and Catholics
in another, or that Germans or people of German descent
should reside only where they were in the majority, and that
Irish and those of Irish descent should dwell only in certain
localities, designated for them by the arbitrary judgment and
permission of a majority of the aldermen. They could apply
the restriction as well to business occupations as to
residences, and could prescribe the localities allotted to each
class of people without reference to whether the majority
already therein is of the proscribed race, nationality, or
political or religious faith.109
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The court also compared the ordinance to the policy of ethnic
conflicts overseas.110 It cited the “Irish Pale,” a limit which prescribed
where the “native Irish or Celtic population” could reside and noted that the
policy had in part driven them to immigrate to America.111 It also compared
the ordinance to the policy in Russia of restricting Jews to “ghettoes” that
remained in place and the resulting immigration of Jews to America in “vast
numbers.”112
The court, however, stopped short of connecting the harm that the
policies visited upon the Irish and Jews, which they viewed as morally
reprehensible,113 to the immorality of applying the policy to African
Americans. Instead, the court couched the problem within the economic
interests of whites in maintaining their black labor force in the fact of efforts
by labor agents to recruit them to leave the state.114 The mass emigration
of the Irish and Jews from Europe suggested that “the result of this policy
might well be a large exodus and naturally of the most enterprising and
thrifty element of the colored race, leaving the unthrifty and less desirable
element in this state on the taxpayers.”115 Thus, the ordinance interfered
with “a public policy of retaining the colored laborers in this state.”116
Rachel Godsil has observed that the decision “sends more complex
messages” despite the language’s suggestion of “respect for the ideal of
equal treatment.”117 Even the discussion of the exodus of Irish and Jews to
America as a result of the restrictive policies in their home countries
“evinces a more material reason for the court’s vehement condemnation of
racial zoning”118—namely, an analogy of the same flight taking place with
respect to blacks leaving North Carolina.
It is not surprising, however, that this policy reason did not carry the
day in preventing the adoption of other anti-black land use policies in later
years. Derrick Bell’s interest convergence thesis 119 would suggest that the
110

Darnell, 81 S.E. at 339.
Id.
112
Id.
113
See Id. (lamenting the “continued disorder and unrest in that unhappy island”
that the policy of restriction of movement based on ethnicity brought to Ireland).
114
See Id. at 340. It is notable that North Carolina’s high court decided the case
in 1915, at the start of the first wave of the Great Migration during which thousands of
African Americans left the South in the hope of finding freedom in the North. See generally
ISABEL WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF OTHER SUNS: THE EPIC STORY OF AMERICA’S
GREAT MIGRATION (2011). Many of them were recruited by labor agents. See id.
115
Darnell, 81 S.E. at 340.
116
Id.
117
Godsil, supra note 3, at 540.
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Id.
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Derrick Bell argued in one of his most famous writings that “[t]he interest of
blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the
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court’s decision striking down Winston-Salem’s racial zoning ordinance
provided a win for racial justice for blacks, including William Darnell, the
“colored man” who moved into a house on the wrong street and brought the
case appealing his conviction for this offense.120 At the same time, it
converged with the white economic interests in avoiding explicitly racist
prohibitions that reminded black residents of the evils of the Jim Crow
system under which they lived in order to quell unrest and retain access to
black labor. Once it became clear that Southern elected officials could not
stem the tide of black migrants taking their labor with them to other states,
it was no longer in their interest to refrain from passing measures that would
subject the remaining black population—whom it regarded as “unthrifty
and less desirable”—to worse living conditions at the expense of whites.
4. Buchanan v. Warley
The racial zoning ordinance in Louisville was challenged all the
way up to the U.S. Supreme Court in Buchanan v. Warley in 1917.121 In
the case, Charles Buchanan, a white realtor, entered into a contract to sell
his property to William Warley, a black postal employee, but the contract
included an escape clause that Warley would not be required to pay unless
he was allowed by law to live on the property. 122 Buchanan sued Warley
for specific performance, and Warley raised the racial zoning ordinance as
a defense.123 Warley argued that he could not perform on the contract
because the property was in a whites-only zone and the ordinance prevented
him from taking possession because he was black. 124 The Supreme Court
interests of whites.” Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the InterestConvergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980).
120
See Darnell, 81 S.E. at 338.
121
245 U.S. 60 (1917).
122
Id. at 69-73.
123
Id.
124
Id.; see DELANEY, supra note 40, at 114-15; Bernstein, supra note 82, at 83942. Buchanan v. Warley is one of the NAACP’s earliest examples of impact litigation. The
Louisville chapter of the NAACP started in an effort to challenge the passage of the city’s
racial zoning law, and Warley was an active member. The NAACP represented Warley,
the black defendant, in the case as part of a strategic assault against racial zoning policies.
The NAACP viewed Buchanan as an ideal test case because it believed that the case was
more likely to be successful if it argued that the ordinance violated the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause rather than the Equal Protection Clause. “[T]o put it
baldly, the segregation movement would more likely be stopped if it were shown to
compromise the property rights of whites than if it merely denied the civil rights of blacks.”
See DELANEY, supra note 40, at 115. Their estimation was correct, and the Court ruled in
their favor on those grounds. The Court’s opinion also indicates that using equal protection
for blacks as a core argument would probably have failed.
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ruled that the ordinance violated the Fourteenth Amendment, which
includes the right to “acquire, enjoy, and dispose of . . . property,” because
it restricted the right of property owners to sell their property on the basis
of race.125 It also found that similar racial zoning ordinances extended
beyond the scope of the police power by limiting property rights and were
thus invalid.126
The Court’s decision in Buchanan had profound social implications
for defining “Jim Crow’s legal limits.”127 W.E.B. DuBois, arguably the
father of American sociology, credited Buchanan with “‘the breaking of the
backbone of segregation.”’ 128 The late Judge Leon Higginbotham argued
that “Buchanan was of profound importance in applying a brake to
decelerate what would have been run-away racism in the United States” 129
Indeed, courts did summarily reject several iterations of zoning ordinances
based on the authority in Buchanan alone shortly after it was decided.130
The foundation of the reasoning in Buchanan, however, worked like a
poison pill, limiting the anti-racist implications of the ruling from the start.
After the decision in Buchanan, the state court decisions reviewing
racial zoning ordinances indicate that the courts were “willing to accept
race as a ground to prevent property ownership and to distinguish the
quality of race from ethnicity or party membership.”131 Race remained
central in decision-making and lost none of its legitimacy. In short,
discriminatory land use policies based on racial zoning continued after
Buchanan because the ruling did not truly challenge the “architecture of
segregation.”132
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Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 79-82.
Id. at 81.
127
Godsil, supra note 3, at 557. Godsil argues that, in the context of lawsuits to
ban the presence of blacks in certain areas, “court decisions invalidating the property rights
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juridical apartheid.” Id. at 549.
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130
See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 103 A. 910 (Md. 1918) (striking down Baltimore’s
ordinance on the authority of Buchanan after the city’s many revisions and defenses);
Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927) (striking down New Orleans’s ordinance) (per
curiam); City of Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930) (per curiam) (striking down
new iteration of Richmond ordinance).
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At its core, racial inequality is “the product of systematic past and
current, formal and informal, mechanisms of racial subordination.” 133
Racializing space was a critical part of this process in crafting the
architecture of racial segregation and disadvantage. American law has long
maintained “a pattern – a custom – of valorizing whiteness.”134 Property
designated for the use of whites receives an inordinate amount of protection
to the detriment of any property interest held by other populations. 135 In
today’s climate, individuals seeking to exclude African Americans from
spaces that they have a legal right to occupy can abuse the historic and
cultural coding of certain spaces, like elite universities, as white spaces to
justify their demands for exclusion. 136 “When sites are racialized via
racially exclusionary policies or practices, those sites communicate a
cultural norm of racial hierarchy.”137
The racializing of spaces as “black” and denigrating those spaces
accordingly while at the same time valorizing white spaces also serves this
interest in communicating racial hierarchy and white supremacy. One of
the leading articles analyzing the historical significance of Buchanan
suggests that the decision “limited the ability of whites to prevent AfricanAmericans from moving into white neighborhoods, and discouraged whites
from denying public services to African-American neighborhoods.”138
While Buchanan had some success in removing this explicit barrier to entry
in a white neighborhood, local government land use policy after Buchanan
belies the conclusion that the end of explicit racial zoning kept white city
government leaders from denying public services to black neighborhoods.
Litigation brought under the Fair Housing Act and other civil rights laws
has involved several challenges to long-standing denials of the
discriminatory provision of public services to black communities. 139 This
133

Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness As Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1753

(1993).
134

Id. at 1728 (emphasis in original). Indeed, Derrick Bell takes this position
further by describing this racist ideology not just a as “pattern” or a “custom,” but as “an
integral, permanent, and indestructible component of this society.” Derrick Bell, The
Racism Is Permanent Thesis: Courageous Revelation or Unconscious Denial of Racial
Genocide, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 571, 573 (1993).
135
See id.; Prakash, supra note 10.
136
Henderson & Jefferson-Jones, supra note 4, at 883; see also KATHARINA
PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITAL: HOW THE LAW CREATES WEALTH AND INEQUALITY
(2019) (detailing the power of adding “legal coding” to an asset to change its operation
and give it wealth-generating potential).
137
Henderson & Jefferson-Jones, supra note 4, at 883; see also Boddie, supra
note 12, at 409.
138
Bernstein, supra note 82, at 859.
139
See, e.g., Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, Miss., 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971),
aff’d on reh’g, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972) (finding that city government’s practice of
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practice degrades the property values and livability of the black
communities that it harms, to the benefit of white taxpayers in other sections
of the community who receive adequate services. It was also one of the
earliest harbingers of the measures that local governments would take to
engage in racial zoning by another name.
5. Euclid and Legitimizing the Goals of Racial Zoning
In 1926, the United States Supreme Court approved zoning land for
different uses as a legitimate exercise of the police power by local
governments—well after the heyday of the racial zoning ordinance
movement in the 1910s.140 In seeking to give guidance on when a zoning
ordinance might be validly applied, the Court recommended consulting the
maxim at the heart of the common law of nuisances: sic utere tuo ut alienum
non laedas,141 which is translated to mean, “use your own property so as
not to injure that of another.”142 The Court placed a great deal of faith in
the law of nuisances—a doctrine that was already firmly established and
that most lawyers and public officials readily understood—as providing
useful clues for determining if a zoning ordinance was valid in a given
situation.143 If a thing is a nuisance, it can be zoned apart from residential
areas. “[T]he question whether a particular thing is a nuisance, is to be
determined, not by an abstract consideration of the building or of the thing
considered apart, but by considering it in connection with the circumstances
and the locality.”144
Justice Sutherland provided an analogy to indicate that a nuisance
is not inherently bad, it may just have its own place: “A nuisance may be
merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead of
providing inferior municipal services to black neighborhoods violated the Equal Protection
Clause); Kennedy v. City of Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 2d 456, 492-98 (S.D. Ohio 2007)
(granting summary judgment on compensatory damages claims where black plaintiffs
alleged that the city maintained “a policy, pattern, and practice of denying public water
service to the individual [p]laintiffs during the last fifty years because they are AfricanAmerican and/or because they reside in a predominantly African-American
neighborhood”); Franks v. Ross, 313 F.3d 184, 194-96 (4th Cir. 2002) (upholding
timeliness of § 1982 claim brought by residents of black town claiming that the county
was siting an undesirable landfill nearby based on race); Southend Neighborhood
Improvement Ass’n v. Cnt’y of St. Clair, 743 F.2d 1207, 1211-12 (7th Cir. 1984); Miller
v. City of Dallas, No. Civ.A. 3:98-CV-2955-D, 2002 WL 230834, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb.
14, 2002).
140
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
141
Id. at 387.
142
57 AM. JUR. 2D NEGLIGENCE § 89 (2010).
143
Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387-88.
144
Id. at 388.
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the barnyard.”145 The Court affirmed this nuisance view of zoning, but did
nothing to counter the idea of people being labeled as nuisances—namely,
blacks affected by discriminatory racial zoning policies.146
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co.147 contributed to the enduring legacy of racial zoning in the
jurisdictions that attempted to work around the court decisions striking
down explicit racial zoning ordinances. Even though scholars have debated
the array of motives that drove the early advocates for general zoning
ordinances, it is clear that they sought to “keep incompatible uses
separate.”148 As Florence Wagman Roisman has observed, “Euclidean
zoning was developed as state and lower federal courts were invalidating
explicit racial zoning; certainly, the timing of the development of
‘Euclidean’ zoning suggests that part of its purpose was to enable local
jurisdictions to segregate residents on the basis of race as well as
economics.”149 Advocates for explicit racial zoning often realized that

145

Id. The federal government extended this practice to treating black residents
as nuisances to be avoided and kept out of white neighborhoods. See Ford, supra note 95,
at 1848 (“The Federal Housing Administration, which insured private mortgages,
advocated the use of zoning and deed restrictions to bar undesirable people and classified
black neighbors as nuisances to be avoided along with ‘stables’ and ‘pig pens’”).
146
The irony of the reference to nuisances as “pigs” is that Baltimore, the first
city to pass a racial zoning ordinance, maintained a black community that it referred to as
“Pigtown.” Power, supra note 61, at 290. Between 1880 and 1900, Baltimore’s black
population increased by almost half, from 54,000 to 79,000. See id. Blacks arrived in
Baltimore with little money and very few job opportunities. Id. Many of them rented small
shacks, often with two families to a house, in order to pay the rent, creating Baltimore’s
first sizeable slum. Id. A news report from 1892 described the area in these terms:
Open drains, great lots filled with high weeds, ashes and garbage
accumulated in the alleyways, cellars filled with filthy black water,
houses that are total strangers to the touch of whitewash or scrubbing
brush, human bodies that have been strangers for months to soap and
water, villainous looking negroes who loiter and sleep around the street
corners and never work; vile and vicious women, with but a smock to
cover their black nakedness, lounging in the doorways or squatting upon
the steps, hurling foul epithets at every passerby; foul streets, foul
people, in foul tenements filled with foul air; that’s ‘Pigtown.’
Id. (citing Baltimore News, Sept. 20, 1892, quoted in JAMES B. CROOKS, POLITICS &
PROGRESS: THE RISE OF URBAN PROGRESSIVISM IN BALTIMORE, 1895 TO 1911 20 (1968)).
147
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
148
See Godsil, supra note 12, at 1862 (quoting Harr, Preface to ZONING AND THE
AMERICAN DREAM, supra note 6, at x).
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Florence Wagman Roisman, Opening the Suburbs to Racial Integration:
Lessons for the 21st Century, 23 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 65, 93-94 (2001).
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“[t]he defects of explicit racial segregation ordinances could be cured by
employing use zoning to achieve the same result.”150
The persistence of anti-black zoning and land use policies actually
has its genesis in the decision that struck down explicit racial zoning and
the decision that upheld facially neutral, general zoning ordinances.
Buchanan’s failure to outlaw state-imposed racial segregation in housing
left the door open for cities and towns to reproduce the same inequalities
through different policies that would achieve the same policy goals of racial
segregation and white supremacy.
While racial discrimination in housing nationally focused on private
market forces and federal housing policy, the South faced these same
challenges and placed more emphasis on the abuse of zoning and anti-black
land use policies. Urban planning historians explain that the South’s pattern
developed differently as a result of lower residential density and wider
spatial dispersion of black neighborhoods across the city. 151 Local
governments have kept exclusionary zoning ordinances, land use
regulations, and local investment strategies in their larger political
repertoire to impede the full participation of rural minorities. 152 The legacy
of racial zoning also indicates that these urban development policies limited
access to housing, social mobility, and economic development for black
communities.
Court challenges to policies in housing and public services that
disadvantage African Americans testify to the legacy of racial
discrimination in land use and the effect that it continues to have on black
communities even after the end of legalized segregation in the South. As
late as 1950, the Texas legislature conferred upon cities the power to
separate residential areas on the basis of race; the law remained on the
books until 1969.153 More than forty years before the state legislature
explicitly authorized municipalities to pass laws enforcing residential
segregation, the charter for the city of Dallas expressly gave the city the
power to require complete racial separation. 154 Although the United States
Supreme Court struck down the use of segregation ordinances in 1917,155
150
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the city continued to enforce its race-restrictive laws156 and did not repeal
the ordinance until 1968. Twenty years later, the city admitted that its racial
zoning laws “established ‘racially segregated housing patterns [that] have
not yet been fully eradicated,’” even though the city had stopped
considering race in providing housing. 157 In Florida, an ordinance
prohibiting racial “intermingling” dated back to 1914, but remained on the
books until 1975, and the court recognized that the ordinance contributed
to the pattern of blacks living on “the other side of the tracks.” 158
These residential patterns leave physical reminders of the legacy of
Jim Crow and shape the context and limits of community development and
affordable housing in the South. In the words of another historian, “the
history of race relations in the United States has been the history of conflict
over spatial relations. The geographies that we all live in tell the tale.”159
Various tools in the law of land use were appropriated and became part of
the arsenal in the conflict that mostly white state actors in Southern cities
have waged to maintain white supremacy.
IV. THE LEGACY OF RACIAL ZONING AND CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES
Part IV lays out the effects of what I argue are the most problematic
anti-black land use policies affecting access to integrated housing and social
opportunity in the South today. Historians, urban planners, and legal
scholars alike have found that “resourceful” local officials adapted the land
use policies that follow to “pursue the same goals by less racially explicit
156

See City of Dallas v. Liberty Annex Corp., 19 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Civ. App.
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App. 1940) (upholding a restriction of housing projects to black residents because the city
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Walker, 734 F. Supp. at 1291, 1294 n.18, 1314 (finding the city liable for
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Ammons v. Dade City, 594 F. Supp. 1274, 1280-88 (M.D. Fla. 1984), aff'd,
783 F.2d 982 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding the city in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
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means.”160
“[U]rban planning—particularly through zoning, urban
renewal, and public housing—has had a significant impact on where blacks
could live and therefore on their freedom to live in decent neighborhoods
with good public services.”161 Cities began taking a race-based approach
to urban planning and used zoning as the primary regulatory tool in ways
that were facially neutral, but discriminatory in practice.
The anti-black land use policies that developed during and after
Buchanan reflected the same background principle expressed in racial
zoning: blacks were considered nuisances that could be relegated to
communities among other undesirable land uses and excluded from the
larger social and economic structure of the towns and cities in which they
lived. The legacy of racial zoning that follows Buchanan and Euclid
revolves around a process of confinement and degradation. Cities used
zoning laws to confine African Americans into certain areas. This
confinement facilitated the degradation of these communities. This Article
highlights three major policies: (1) the location of black communities in the
least desirable areas, (2) the lack of protective zoning, and (3) the
disproportionate siting of locally undesirable land uses (LULUs) in or near
majority-black communities. These three policies came together to
reinforce white supremacy by racializing black space, identifying it as
degraded and unlivable.
A. The Location of Black Communities in the Least Desirable Areas
“It is quite simple. As soon as there is a group area then all
your uncertainties are removed and that is, after all, the
primary purpose of this Bill” [requiring racial segregation in
housing and the assignment of racial groups to particular
districts].162
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CHARLES E. CONNERLY, “THE MOST SEGREGATED CITY IN AMERICA”: CITY
PLANNING AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN BIRMINGHAM, 1920-1980 1 (2005) (arguing that
Birmingham provides a case study of a city in the South where white government officials
used planning and zoning as a regulatory tool to control the city black access to
opportunity); see also CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE, AND
AUDACIOUS JUDGES (1996).
162
See Sam Fulwood III, The Costs of Segregation and the Benefits of the Fair
Housing Act, in THE FIGHT FOR FAIR HOUSING: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND FUTURE
IMPLICATIONS OF THE 1968 FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ACT (Gregory D. Squires, ed. 2017)
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The logic that a former minister of the interior in apartheid South
Africa provided in a legislative debate to justify the passage of that
country’s Group Areas Act of 1950 reflects the power of confinement in
maintaining white supremacy and racial subordination. Cities used facially
neutral zoning laws after Euclid in pernicious, race-conscious ways well
into the mid-twentieth century.163 These laws played a critical role in
achieving the goal of excluding African Americans from white
neighborhoods.164 Just as important, however, is that zoning laws served
to confine African Americans into their own separate neighborhoods. As
Elise Boddie has argued, “[s]egregation further limited black mobility and
spatialized racial power in public and private spaces.”165 This confinement
facilitated the degradation of these spaces as part of a long-term project to
racially code them as “black,” in opposition to protected white space.
The legacy of racial zoning relied on the use of the power to draw
legal boundaries as a means of creating these conditions of confinement.
According to Richard Thompson Ford, “[l]egal boundaries are often
ignored because they are imagined to be either the product of aggregated
individual choices or the administratively necessary segmentation of
163

See, e.g., Christopher Silver, The Racial Origins of Zoning: Southern Cities
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Affs. v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 539 (2015) (noting that the
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STAN. L. REV. 767, 780 (1969); Rabin, Expulsive Zoning: The Inequitable Legacy of
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centralized governmental power.”166 In the context of racial zoning, the
practice could escape notice because cities framed it within the context of
their administrative obligations to regulate the use of land. As Rachel
Godsil has observed, however: “Abstractly, at least, the question of who
lives where is an issue of land use. Thus, land use law was utilized by
whites to keep Blacks from having access to property in white
neighborhoods.”167
In addition to keeping blacks away from whites, land use law served
to confine blacks to spaces into which local governments locked them. This
confinement was essential to establishing racial disadvantage. As Ford has
pointed out, “political geography—the position and function of
jurisdictional and quasi-jurisdictional boundaries—helps to promote a
racially separate and unequal distribution of political influence and
economic resources.”168 While this premise deals with the boundaries of
cities and towns rather than spaces within a city, like neighborhoods, it
provides a crucial starting point for understanding the power in drawing
lines to create racially identified space.
In many towns, the early racial zoning ordinances limited black
residents to those locations that had already become mostly black. The
ordinances generally barred white residents from moving onto blocks
where black residents lived at the time the jurisdiction passed the ordinance
and vice versa.169 Later ordinances, however, sought to proactively assign
blacks to particular spaces. For example, in 1926, the city of Birmingham,
Alabama, adopted an ordinance that created specific residential districts
designated for blacks and others designated for whites.170 In State v.
166
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public assembly, any house” on a street where the “greater number of houses” were
occupied by persons of a different race than the individual charged).
170
Monk v. City of Birmingham, 87 F. Supp. 538, 539 (N.D. Ala. 1949), decree
aff’d, 185 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1950) (describing ordinance with section which provided that
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Wilson, the Florida Supreme Court overturned the criminal convictions of
an African American couple who moved into an area designated for whites
on a map with boundaries that the Dade County, Florida, Board of
Commissioners had drawn up under a racial zoning ordinance passed in
1945.171 The court struck down the ordinance which sought to “segregate
areas within which property could be occupied by negroes and not occupied
by Caucasians, and vice versa” and provided for “boundaries . . . [that] shall
constitute the dividing line between the White and Colored people” in the
county outside of Miami.172 Inside Miami, however, the city’s racial zoning
ordinance and policies limited black residents to Overtown—a
neighborhood originally called “Colored Town”—and a small number of
other racially segregated neighborhoods. 173
Once a local government had established particular racial
boundaries for blacks and whites, it could legislate around those boundaries
to ensure the conditions of confinement remained in place. 174 In 1949,
Birmingham amended its 1926 racial zoning ordinance and made it a
misdemeanor “to move into, for the purpose of establishing a permanent
residence, or having moved into, to continue to reside in an area in the City
of Birmingham generally and historically recognized at the time as an area
for occupancy by members of the colored race.”175 It assigned the same
restriction to blacks on the same terms. 176 The codification of racial
boundaries in the earlier ordinance more than twenty years before made
these “generally and historically recognized” patterns possible.
The confinement of black residents into particular areas often
included decisions to designate the most undesirable locations with built-in
environmental risks and disadvantages for black occupancy. These
residential conditions often began with explicit state action. For example,
starting in the latter part of the nineteenth century, many African Americans
in Washington, D.C., were relegated to living near the “dirty and polluted
banks of the Anacostia River.”177 After World War II, the District of
“no building or part thereof in certain residence districts shall be occupied or used by
persons of the Negro Race” and a separate section that barred whites from occupying
buildings in “certain other residence districts”).
171
See State v. Wilson, 25 So. 2d 860, 860 (Fla. 1946).
172
See id. at 861.
173
See Raymond A. Mohl, Making the Second Ghetto in Metropolitan Miami,
1940-1960, 21 J. URB. HIST. 395, 397-98 (1995).
174
Bernstein, supra note 82, at 862 (noting that “racial zones dictated
Birmingham's residential development patterns from 1926 to 1949”); see also Silver, supra
note 163.
175
Monk, 87 F. Supp. at 539 (emphasis added).
176
Id.
177
See Ueland & Warf, supra note 15, at 65.
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Columbia government built a public housing project for black residents
near this area, which reinforced racial segregation in the capital. During
the same time period of the 1940s, the city of Dallas developed plans to
locate a segregated African American community known as Cadillac
Heights in an area that it knew was a floodplain. 178
Urban geographers Jeff Ueland and Barney Warf have argued that
“[t]he multiple, complex, contingent ways in which the literal shape of the
urban physical topography reflects and sustains racialized social
relationships have largely escaped serious scholarly scrutiny.”179 This
landscape plays a critical role in understanding the legacy of racial zoning
and the structure of confinement and degradation of black space that it
facilitated.
Dating back to the rise of Jim Crow, black communities in the South
“often found themselves consigned to the least desirable areas, many of
which were swampy, mosquito infested, prone to smoke from fires, and
frequented by floods” in part due to exclusionary zoning.180 In their 2006
study of the relationship between race, residential segregation, and altitude
in Southern cities, Ueland and Warf found that blacks lived at higher
elevations in riverfront or coastal cities, and properties with views of rivers
or coastlines were predominately white. 181 By contrast, in cities further
inland and away from coastlines, African American communities were
generally situated in low-lying areas, while whites occupied more desirable
land at higher elevations.182
This pattern of limiting blacks to low-lying areas has dramatic
effects in natural disasters. Environmental & Energy (E&E) News, a
division of Politico, analyzed $31 billion in claims for flood damage paid
by the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) National
Flood Insurance Program between January 2010 and August 2019 and the
ZIP codes in which the flood damage occurred. 183 Nearly twenty percent
of the claim dollars went to ZIP codes where at least one-quarter of the
178

Miller v. City of Dallas, No. CIV.A.3:98-CV-2955-D, 2002 WL 230834, at *4
(N.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2002) (denying summary judgment in part because plaintiffs
established that the city designated their majority-black community a “negro district” in
the 1940s as part of its racial-zoning policy, in violation of Buchanan, and excluded the
majority-black community from the levee system).
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Ueland & Warf, supra note 15, at 54.
180
Id. at 56.
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Id. at 63.
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Id.
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Thomas Frank, Flooding Disproportionately Harms Black Neighborhoods,
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(June
2,
2020),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/flooding-disproportionately-harms-blackneighborhoods/.
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residents are black.184 These ZIP codes made up only thirteen percent of
the U.S. population, which suggests that blacks were hit harder by floodrelated disasters.185
The experience on the ground in places like New Orleans bears out
these numbers. Commentators have explained that African Americans in
New Orleans could not return to the city as quickly as whites because three
quarters of homes owned or occupied by black residents in New Orleans
suffered severe water damage compared to only half of the white homes.186
“This flood damage is itself a legacy of racial discrimination and poverty,
because, historically, higher income and overwhelmingly white residents
occupied the higher ground in New Orleans.”187
New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina reflects the present-day effect
of racial zoning and the effect of the state’s failure to provide protections
against a natural disaster. It also reflects the power of place and a policy
choice of either preserving the location of historically black communities
that were deliberately placed on land filled with hazards. New Orleans
enacted a racial zoning ordinance that the U.S. Supreme Court struck down
in 1927.188 Over time, however, many of New Orleans’s racial patterns in
housing have remained in place. New Orleans lies between the Mississippi
River to the south and Lake Pontchartrain to the north, a formation that has
earned it the nickname the “Crescent City.” 189 Whites historically occupied
the highest and best part of a natural levee, the land at the highest points
above sea level. Black residents were limited to occupying the lowest lying
land: “[B]lacks were pushed into the demiland on the inland margin of the
natural levee, where drainage was bad, foundation material precarious,
streets atrociously unmaintained, mosquitoes endemic and flooding a
recurring hazard.”190 The area was interrupted by commercial zones along
the Carondelet and New Basin canals, and later by the building of
boulevards which attracted affluent whites. But by the mid-twentieth

184

Id.
Id.
186
See William P. Quigley, Katrina Voting Wrongs: Aftermath of Hurricane
and Weak Enforcement Dilute African American Voting Rights in New Orleans, 14
WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 49, 60 (2007); see also CRAIG E. COLTEN, AN
UNNATURAL METROPOLIS: WRESTING NEW ORLEANS FROM NATURE 77-107 (2005)
(emphasizing the inequity in housing distribution across flood plains around New
Orleans).
187
Quigley, supra note 186 (citations omitted).
188
See Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927).
189
PEIRCE F. LEWIS, NEW ORLEANS: THE MAKING OF AN URBAN LANDSCAPE,
Figure 3 (2003) (map of “New Orleans and vicinity, 2002”).
190
Id. at 52.
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century, the area had become crowded, the formerly non-black sections
filled up, and it merged into a larger ghetto. 191
The Lower Ninth Ward, another one of the city’s largest majorityblack residential areas, is bordered by the Mississippi River to the south and
the city’s Industrial Canal to the west.192 When Hurricane Katrina hit New
Orleans in 2005, flooding from the river and the breaking of the Industrial
Canal decimated the Lower Ninth Ward.193 The location separated the area
from the rest of New Orleans and made it a less than ideal location for
rebuilding with affordable housing and economic development. The
vulnerability of the land served as a nuisance to higher-income white New
Orleans residents, and they located blacks within that area—reserving the
best land for themselves. 194 According to historian Charles Connerly,
“Birmingham was planned not only as an industrial city but also as a city

191

Id.
Id. at Figure 4 (map of “Neighborhoods and landmarks of New Orleans,
2001”). Even during the era of massive “white flight” to the suburbs, the Lower Ninth
Ward remained more than eighty-percent African American from 1970 to 2000, according
to the U.S. Census Bureau of Housing.
193
See Carlton Waterhouse, in HURRICANE KATRINA: AMERICA’S UNNATURAL
DISASTER 156, 172-178 (Jeremy I. Levitt & Matthew C. Whitaker eds., 2009). Waterhouse
argues that the isolation of these communities contributed to the political decision to leave
them unprepared in the event of a major storm. Id. The New Orleans Levee Board ran the
New Orleans Flood Protection System, which had oversight for the levee and barriers
around the Lower Ninth Ward. Id. The board neglected to invest in shoring up the levee
system around the Lower Ninth Ward in favor of pursuing other development projects,
including parks, marinas, a dock, and a “cash strapped” airport. Id. at 172. The author also
reports that the Army Corps of Engineers, a partner organization for the flood protection
system, failed to follow standard operating procedure and Executive Order 12898, which
requires that federal agencies including the Army Corps “identify and address
disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of its
programs, policies, and activities on minority populations.” Id. at 174. The Army Corps
could have conducted an investigation based on the order and recognized the vulnerability
of the Lower Ninth Ward and nearby areas, which were predominantly African American,
poor, and very susceptible to suffer severe damage in the event of a Category 3 hurricane.
Id. Another local levee board in nearby Jefferson Parish, a majority white community, took
additional steps and spent $200,000 to enhance its levee system before the storm, despite
the fact that the Army Corps did not provide the funding. Id. As a result, the area was
largely protected, even against the storm’s 145-mile-per-hour winds. Id. In the same way,
the author contends that these mitigation efforts could have protected the heavilypopulated New Orleans district, including the Lower Ninth Ward, even though financial
difficulties prevented them from adding protection for the entire city. Id. at 174-75.
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Miller v. City of Dallas, No. CIV.A.3:98-CV-2955-D, 2002 WL 230834
(N.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2002) (denying summary judgment in part because plaintiffs
established that the city designated their majority-black community a “negro district” in
the 1940s as part of its racial zoning policy, in violation of Buchanan, and excluded their
majority black community from the levee system).
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that relied heavily on black labor.”195 The city “forc[ed] black labor to live
in the city’s ‘vacant spaces,’ near creeks and railroads where whites did not
wish to live,” a set of conditions which ultimately set the stage for the civil
rights struggle that took hold throughout the mid-twentieth century.196
Likewise, Birmingham used federal highway construction funds to
“relocate blacks to less desirable locations.” 197 Interstate 59 divided the
black community of Ensley from the white section known as Ensley
Highlands, a name which suggests its elevated status in a region where
blacks occupied low-lying sections of the inner city and whites increasingly
moved to suburbs built in the “highlands.”198 In this way, local
governments in the South used the power to control options for black
residency to “force communities of color to bear a disproportionate share
of environmental harms.”199
Scholars often argue that whites’ preference to live apart from
blacks is one of driving forces for continued residential segregation. 200
Indeed, whites have avoided neighborhoods with large black populations
because of negative perceptions of the neighborhoods, including fears of
crime and the quality of high-minority schools.201 These purported
concerns, however, do not fully take into account the role of state action in
shaping these choices.202 State action also played a critical role in shaping
195

CONNERLY, supra note 161, at 10.
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Ueland & Warf, supra note 15, at 68.
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Archer, supra note 14, at 1302.
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See, e.g., Robert G. Schwemm, Overcoming Structural Barriers to Integrated
Housing: A Back-to-the-Future Reflection on the Fair Housing Act's “Affirmatively
Further” Mandate, 100 KY. L.J. 125, 133 (2012) (arguing that “many whites have a
stronger preference than minorities for predominantly white neighborhoods as opposed to
integrated neighborhoods, and the groups’ respective willingness to pay more for houses
in their preferred areas tends to perpetuate segregation”); Power, supra note 61, at 322–23
(1983) (“Residential housing in Baltimore remains by-in-large segregated. In part this
segregation is a result of preference: Blacks and whites alike may prefer to live in their old
neighborhoods that developed in the days of de facto segregation.”).
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See Olatunde Johnson, The Last Plank: Rethinking Public and Private Power
to Advance Fair Housing, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1191, 1211-12 (2011); Deborah L.
McKoy & Jeffrey M. Vincent, Housing and Education: The Inextricable Link, in
SEGREGATION: THE RISING COSTS FOR AMERICA 125, 128 (James H. Carr & Nandinee K.
Kutty eds., 2008) (noting a connection between school segregation and racial steering).
202
See, e.g., MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 83, at 77 (“Contemporary housing
choices do not reflect preferences so much as they reflect a structural system that was built
on racism.”); Richard Thompson Ford, Geography and Sovereignty: Jurisdictional
Formation and Racial Segregation, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1388 (1997) (“As a matter of
causation, one cannot neatly sever ‘private choice’ from government imposition, since
government helped to create the context in which the private choices occur.”).
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these choices, down to the topographical location of black and white
communities themselves. When it comes to whites moving into historically
black neighborhoods, whites may also avoid these neighborhoods where
they have developed in or near flood plains or low-lying areas. Location
itself affects housing choices in ways that extend beyond simple preference.
I argue that state-sanctioned decisions have partly created these conditions
to reinforce the association between black space and disadvantage, a
process that incentivizes segregation.
These circumstances also grew out of the types of land that white
Southerners allowed blacks to occupy and on which they allowed blacks to
build communities. In 1865, a group of freed slaves in North Carolina
established the settlement of Freedom Hill, which is believed to be the
oldest town chartered by freed slaves in the United States.203 Freedom Hill
was later incorporated as Princeville in honor of its founder in 1885.204 The
town was situated on marshes and swamp land along the Tar River in
eastern North Carlina.205 One historian describes Princeville as “an
important case of historical environmental injustice because of the ways in
which early Princeville settlers were forced to occupy the most vulnerable
riparian landscape in the nineteenth century.” 206 From 1865 to 1958, there
were six documented floods of the Tar-Pimlico River basin.207 A 2016 New
York Times article explained that many of the town’s 2,100 residents—
ninety-six percent of whom were black—were considering whether to sell
their land, which would devastate the town’s tax base, because they were
struggling to rebuild after constant flooding. 208 For Princeville’s early
black settlers, “[t]heir existence in this space was not a matter of chance or
choice, but instead the discarded and unwanted space was what former
slaveholders allowed them to occupy.”209
The location of communities like Princeville challenges the
assumption that “local governments are formed largely in response to local
desires” and that “[s]uch boundary changes as do occur are often a result of
203

See Jess Bidgood, A Wrenching Decision Where Black History and Floods
Intertwine,
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Richard M. Mizelle, Jr., Princeville and the Environmental Landscape of
Race, in OPEN RIVERS: RETHINKING THE MISSISSIPPI 18 (Spring 2016),
https://openrivers.lib.umn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/openrivers_issue_2-2.pdf.
205
Id.
206
Id.
207
Id. at 20.
208
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Mizelle, Jr., supra note 204 at 19.
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local decisions.”210 While it may be true that “[o]nce created, they are rarely
abolished, and their boundaries are only infrequently modified,” 211 these
decisions are not always made by choice. Richard Thompson Ford has
argued that:
[T]he significance of racially identified political geography
escapes the notice of judges, policymakers, and scholars
because of two widely held yet contradictory
misconceptions—one that assumes that political boundaries
have no effect on the distribution of persons, political
influence, or economic resources, and another that assumes
that political boundaries define quasi-natural and
prepolitical associations of individuals. 212
Communities like Princeville became creatures of the state after
their incorporation. Thus, white state officials during Jim Crow held a great
deal of power regarding the approval of new boundaries, and their decisions
were not devoid of considerations of race. They also must be considered in
the context of the racial violence in the South that faced all-black towns,
which existed precariously at the mercy of white-controlled local
governments and white residents.213 Thus, government at all levels
recognized and preserved these boundaries.
Historical decisions in which local officials and landowners
consigned black communities to certain spaces and why those spaces were
chosen constitute a form of line drawing to create black spaces. Richard
Ford has observed that “the law often tacitly seeks to justify local power
and local boundaries by reference to geography itself—reflecting a view of
210
Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—the Structure of Local Government
Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 73 (1990).
211
Id.
212
Ford, supra note 95, at 1845.
213
Even Princeville itself was no stranger to these harsh conditions, despite
remaining in the space to which it was relegated. “Throughout the twentieth century,
Princeville residents constantly dealt with racial attacks and intimidation, as well as
economic social isolation from the state. Infrastructural neglect from state officials was
consistent during the era of segregation and beyond.” Mizelle, Jr., supra note 204, at 21;
see also Jessica Glenza, Rosewood massacre a harrowing tale of racism and the road
toward
reparations,
THE
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(Jan.
3,
2016,
8:00
EST),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jan/03/rosewood-florida-massacre-racialviolence-reparations (describing assault on all-black Florida town in 1923 where, as a
result of a white mob from the surrounding county pursuing an unfounded allegation of
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local political geography as natural and legitimating, or in other words, as
opaque.”214 Like the process of restricting African American residents to
certain areas, the power to draw lines in the management of a zoning
scheme indeed gives local governments the ability to effectively establish
the location of where a particular socioeconomic demographic of residents
can live. For example, in the aftermath of the groundbreaking decisions in
the cases involving the township of Mount Laurel, New Jersey, in which
the New Jersey Supreme Court struck down the township’s exclusionary
zoning practices, the township defied the spirit of the court’s ruling by
rezoning three plots of land for low-income housing units, one of which
was a wetland near an industrial park. 215 While this case is not in the
context of the South, it shows how policy choices can affect implementation
on the ground in ways that interfere with available remedies, even in the
most progressive fair housing litigation.
Decisions about boundaries and where they exist are not arbitrary
or simply a result of individual preferences. Boundaries and what local
governments locate near or inside of them can reproduce, reify, and solidify
exclusion and inclusion, disadvantage and advantage, on their own.
“[C]ontemporary local government law perpetuates the historically
imposed segregation of the races: local boundaries, once established, are
difficult to alter . . . .”216 The decision to drive black residents into particular
separate areas ensures that racial stratification will take place, even in the
absence of racism. “Spatially and racially defined communities perform
the ‘work’ of segregation silently.”217 Consistent with the apartheid South
African parliamentarian’s argument about the benefits of “group areas” to
the regime: “As soon as there is a group area then all your uncertainties are
removed . . . .”218 Racial segregation grows out of racially identified
spaces.219 “Residential segregation is self-perpetuating, for in segregated
neighborhoods the damaging social consequences that follow from
increased poverty are spatially concentrated, creating uniquely
disadvantaged environments that become progressively isolated—
geographically, socially, and economically—from the rest of society.”220
214
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The literature on boundary making often focuses on lines between
jurisdictions, creating separate towns, cities, and counties. 221 Zoning,
however, also works to draw lines in similar ways and with similar effects.
Thus, the power of line drawing does not simply come from the creation of
jurisdictions. Racial zoning as a practice teaches us that even governmental
decisions to draw lines to manage populations within cities reproduces
similar kinds of inequality.
B. Failure to Provide Protective Zoning
It is important to frame the meaning of the location of a black
community within the broader context of the significance of housing.
“Housing denotes an enormously complicated idea. It refers to . . . a
specific location in relation to work and services, neighbors and
neighborhood, property rights and privacy provisions, income and
investment opportunities . . . .”222 As Rachel Godsil has pointed out:
“Ideally, the comfort of our home extends beyond its walls to the
neighborhood in which it is situated . . . . This ideal is not always
realized.”223 Some homes are surrounded by landfills and incinerators.224
Waste treatment plants that process millions of gallons of raw sewage
invade certain communities and make neighborhoods stink of human
excrement.225 Factories are dumped near these same homes, and diesel
trucks spewing fumes rumble through the streets at seven-minute
increments.226 These communities are all too often ones in which most
residents are people of color.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, courts and
plaintiffs generally looked to the law of nuisance to address proximity to
221
See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 210, 7 at 3-74 (discussing boundaries in the
context of municipalities and noting that “[t]he law of local government formation is
primarily about municipal incorporation”); Ford, supra note 95; Justin P. Steil, Innovative
Responses to Foreclosures: Paths to Neighborhood Stability and Housing Opportunity, 1
COLUM. J. RACE & L. 63, 69 (2011) (arguing that early white suburban homebuyers created
“collective identities [that] were reinforced further by the creation of local government
boundaries (through processes of municipal incorporation or secession)”).
222
ROGER MONTGOMERY & DANIEL R. MANDELKER, HOUSING IN AMERICA:
PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 3 (2d ed. 1979).
223
Godsil, supra note 12, at 1809.
224
See id.
225
Id.
226
Id. at 1809-10. Godsil describes the predominantly black cities of Camden,
New Jersey, and Chester, Pennsylvania. These descriptions, however, are not so strikingly
different from the cities in the case studies discussed in this Article—an indication of the
impact of the logic of racialized zoning even where racial isolation did not grow out of the
context of racial zoning laws.
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undesirable land uses near one’s property before cities adopted zoning
ordinances.227 Indeed, several early cases in Southern and border states
involved white plaintiffs who resorted to nuisance law to challenge the
presence of blacks near their property as a nuisance and held nuisance law
above these racially motivated arguments.228 Courts frequently justified
their decisions on race-neutral grounds, referring to an entitlement to the
benefits of property ownership. For example, in 1886, the Supreme Court
of West Virginia reinstated a lower court’s injunction of a skating rink near
a majority-black neighborhood of tenement houses, reasoning that “every
person, whether white or colored, has the right not to be disturbed in his
home. He has the right to rest and quiet, and not to be materially disturbed
in his rest and enjoyment of home by loud noises.”229
Zoning became an increasingly important part of protecting urban
residential areas from factories and other types of industrial plants as
industrialization thrived during this period.230 As this economic sector
grew, courts became more restrictive in applying the common law doctrine
of nuisance.231 Rather than changing or broadening the doctrine, however,
they often refused to grant injunctive relief for prospective nuisances as a
way of accommodating industrialization.232 The policies that grew out of
racial zoning ordinances, including the refusal to provide protective zoning
to black communities, run contrary to the race neutrality applied under the
law of nuisance. This set of decisions may indeed explain why racial
zoning and the abuse of zoning powers in general became a favored method
for setting up the structure for racial segregation and disadvantage in the
South. After nuisance law failed to enforce their anti-black prejudice,
would-be white plaintiffs had to take a different approach to achieve their
objectives.
Localism accounts for the policies that sustained segregation after
practices like explicit racial zoning were outlawed. 233 While some scholars
have attributed the acceptance of racial segregation to non-racial local

227
Id. at 1859 (“Those focused on the inadequacy of the existing regime [of
nuisance law] looked to local governments and their police power for a resolution.”).
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government decision-making,234 the record of Southern cities that applied
racial zoning ordinances and race-based zoning policies decades after the
practice was outlawed renders implausible the claim that segregation, at
least in the South, grew out of decisions that took no account of race.
Nonetheless, the demise of overt racial discrimination may have served
Southern cities well as they joined cities around the country in justifying
their systems of government in race-neutral terms.235 The turn away from
racially explicit policies also gave these city governments a veneer of
legitimacy as the courts encased the “racially and economically segregated
system of preferences” that they continued to operate.236
The history of general zoning ordinances betrays an underlying
truth that may explain the persistence of policies that arose from the use of
racial zoning ordinances. The zoning movement did not begin with an
interest in protecting every residential property owner equally, and certainly
not with protecting the interests of low-income African American
residents.237
The interests of the wealthy mattered most to the early proponents
of zoning.238 Zoning pioneer Frank Williams wrote in 1922 that, in a
traditional zoning scheme, “the better class residences are for the most part
located remote from industry and not too near business, and workingmen’s
houses, in the neighborhood of their work or near transit lines that will bring
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them cheaply and quickly to it.”239 Consistent with this vision, zoning has
had the greatest success in protecting the single-family homes of affluent
individuals from incompatible land uses. 240
Richard Babcock argued in The Zoning Game, an influential study
of zoning, that the reliance on cumulative zoning241 in the early years of
zoning’s popularity resulted in the industrial zone becoming a “garbage
pail” for all uses, including residences.242 If a home was located in a
garbage pail district, “the misguided or unfortunate person . . . had only
himself to blame.”243 In a city that applied a racial zoning ordinance or
policies that grew out of one, the assignment of a black racial district to an
area shared with an industrial and commercial zone was not a matter of poor
decision making. As Rachel Godsil has noted, “[l]like common law
nuisance doctrine before it, rather than ameliorating the conditions faced by
those worst off, zoning simply enshrined existing differences into law.”244
Richard Ford has argued that “[t]he creation of racially identified
political spaces [makes] possible a number of regulatory activities and
private practices that would further entrench the segregation of the
races.”245 Once race became attached to space, the language of race was no
longer needed. Space took the place of race. Consequently, without
expressly noting “race,” many local governments used zoning to allow
incompatible uses to intrude into black neighborhoods, subsequently
obliterating the quality of life.246 Rachel Godsil explained:
Because other areas of the municipality generally prohibited
such uses, industrial developers would locate in the black
neighborhoods—bringing with them the noise, odors, and
pollution that zoning was ostensibly intended to eliminate
. . . . The combination of expulsive zoning and housing
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discrimination led black communities in urban areas to
become even more blighted and overcrowded. 247
In the South, as in other parts of the country, cities often located
industrial and commercial zones within black communities and used
incompatible zoning near black areas in an effort to confine black residents
to certain neighborhoods.248 Jon Dubin has referred to this set of policy
choices as a failure to provide “protective zoning.” 249 Protective zoning
involves a series of policy choices that conform to the rationale behind
zoning: namely, that of insulating residential areas from commercial and
industrial areas that diminish residential character and quality of life. Dubin
refers to the intermingling of commercial and industrial uses with
residential areas as “incompatible zoning.” 250 In his view, “[r]esidents
deprived of zoning protection are vulnerable to assaults on the safety,
quality, and integrity of their communities ranging from dangerous and
environmentally toxic hazards to more commonplace hazards, such as vile
odors, loud noises, blighting appearances, and traffic congestion.” 251
Dubin’s use of the term “protective zoning” provides a language for the
need to support residential zoning that insulates communities from heavy
commercial and industrial uses; incompatible zoning describes the actual
effect of that failure.
The lack of protective zoning disincentivizes the building of mixedincome housing in these communities—something that furthers segregation
and violates a local government’s duty to affirmatively further fair housing.
It also tends to displace minority communities, a result known as “expulsive
zoning.”252 This failure to offer the same protections to majority or allblack communities that grew out of confinement as a result of racial zoning
and race-based planning policies suggests that some local governments
have a long history of failing to recognize black communities as areas
equally deserving of the city’s zoning protections. For example, Atlanta’s
racial zoning ordinance confined black neighborhoods to areas classified as
industrial.253 The ordinance also assigned zones for black residents less
land than zones designated for whites, which furthered the risk of
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overcrowding.254 In Birmingham in 1940, there were fifteen census tracts
that were at least seventy-five percent black. 255 All but three included
industrial and commercial zoning. 256 Three of the tracts, including the tract
with the highest number of black residents, were not intended for residential
use at all.257 In these areas, black residents essentially lived on land that
either included or was intended to be used for businesses and factories
rather than homes.258 However, in the twenty-six tracts that were majority
white, industrial and commercial zones within or near residential
communities were the exception rather than the norm.259 Thus, the city’s
zoning map provided traditional zoning protections to white communities
but did not provide these same protections to blacks.260 Birmingham was
not alone in policies that generally and plainly “classified white
neighborhoods as residential and black neighborhoods as commercial or
industrial.”261
These policies brought incompatible uses into black neighborhoods
and worked to “destroy the quality of life” in these areas.262 Yet they were
often intentional. As historian David Delaney has explained: “The long
struggle against racial segregation demonstrates that the spatiality of racism
was a central component of the social structure of racial hierarchy, that
efforts to transform or maintain these relations entailed the reconfiguration
or reinforcing of these geographies, and that participants were very much
aware of this.”263
A California court’s decision from the 1940s—the heyday of many
anti-black zoning practices which persisted after Buchanan—highlights the
254
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importance of “zoning equity” in low-income communities of color. 264 In
O’Rourke v. Teeters, a black business owner challenged a zoning ordinance
that did not allow him to operate a business that sold electric fixtures from
his home.265 In response to the argument that his shop would have been an
incompatible commercial use in a residential area, he responded that the
city had undermined its own policy when it allowed two pre-existing
businesses on his block. 266 As it happens today in many black communities,
this hodgepodge of uses did not comport with the usual zoning policy of
separating uses and thus took away the community’s residential character.
After holding that the mere existence of these uses did not fully render a
neighborhood non-residential, the court still overturned the lower court and
affirmed the principle that proper residential zoning is a right:
Any other conclusion would result in a situation where only
those who have been so fortunate as to obtain enough
worldly goods to enable them to erect their homes in districts
beyond the possible approach of commercial enterprises
could be protected in their residences from the
encroachment of business, commercial, and manufacturing
enterprises. It needs no argument to support the thesis that
all classes of our citizens, rich and poor, of whatever race or
creed, are entitled to the equal protection of our laws and the
privilege of living in areas which have been properly zoned
for residential purposes pursuant to the recommendation of
a duly created planning commission. 267
The heritage of racial zoning in the South places another layer of
difficulty on affirming the right to residential zoning that the California
court recognized above. Racial zoning often limited black communities to
the worst-quality land within its borders. The chemical spill in the
Birmingham, Alabama, section of Village Creek provides a classic example
of black residents faced with encroaching industrial uses.

See O’Rourke v. Teeters, 146 P.2d 983 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944).
Id. The court took judicial notice of the fact that the plaintiff and other property
owners could not have acquired separate business property nearby because race-restrictive
covenants barred blacks from purchasing or leasing them. Id. at 984.
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1. Case Study: Birmingham, AL—Discriminatory Zoning and Industrial
Pollution
In 1925, John Charles and Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., drafted a
visionary plan for a park in Birmingham that would incorporate Village
Creek, a small body of water that runs through the city.268 The Olmsted
brothers, whose firm had designed New York City’s Central Park,
envisioned that Village Creek would be much like Boston’s Riverway or
Washington Park in Chicago. 269 However, Birmingham’s racial zoning law
passed the following year. 270 The land alongside the creek flooded often
and was among the least desirable real estate for residences. 271 The city
chose to zone it for black occupancy. 272 This zoning decision blocked the
plan for the park, which could have played a valuable role in the city’s
economic and cultural development. 273 For cities like Birmingham in the
South, racial zoning as a form of segregation led to overall
underdevelopment for the city and region as a whole. 274
The park could operate around the intermittent flooding better than
a neighborhood with permanent residents. 275 As a result, many black
neighborhoods struggled with flooding problems for decades. 276 It was not
until the 1990s that the city, with the help of the federal government, began
to undo the mistakes of the past and converted some of the substandard
neighborhoods along Village Creek to park land. 277 The result of the federal
government’s intervention provides an example of how transformation can
be made that both benefits black residents and furthers economic
development for communities as a whole. An awareness of the historic role
of discriminatory land use policies in limiting access to fair housing and a
refocusing on urban development as part of enforcing the affirmative duty
provision of the Fair Housing Act can make these kinds of opportunities
more identifiable.
The failure to make full amends, however, affected residents who
were left behind. In October 1997, a large fire consumed a downtown
warehouse that contained heavy concentrations of hazardous chemicals.278
268
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Millions of gallons of the water used to douse the fire flooded the sewer
system and washed into Village Creek, which was near the downtown
area.279 Initially, state and county officials denied that toxic chemicals had
leaked from the warehouse.280 The press then reported that nearly fivethousand gallons of a highly concentrated form of Dursban had been
released into the water and air. 281
Within the first few days of the start of the fire, residents living in
the low-income, mainly African-American neighborhoods near Village
Creek “reported smelling noxious fumes and experiencing a variety of
physical symptoms including headaches and nausea.” 282 Dead fish and
other indications of serious environmental problems surfaced as well. 283
Government officials and lawyers from the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), however, failed to act until the hazardous materials and
damage began affecting higher-income white neighborhoods
downstream.284 “[Black residents] believed that the spill would have been
taken more seriously if the damage had occurred in a better-off white
neighborhood where residents were white.” 285 It turned out to be true; a
temporary filtration dam was built to protect those higher-income white
areas from further pollution, but it failed. 286 Civil suits were also filed on
behalf of those areas, raising concerns over property values and the damage
to the water supply.287
However, as of the date of this Article more than twelve years later,
little had been done to remedy the short and long-term consequences of the
spill on residents of Village Creek. Public health officials made very little
headway in determining the long-term consequences, despite receiving a
number of reports of medical problems connected with the Dursban spill. 288
Apathy permeates the response to the Dursban spill on the physical and
mental health of Village Creek residents.289 Even blood samples taken from
279
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the residents were lost, and few if any authorities were held accountable. 290
The dismissal fits the pattern for a community that has long suffered from
environmental problems because of its location and the legacy of racism.291
“Village Creek is a dumping ground for industrial waste . . . Residence
[t]here is stressful and dangerous.” 292 Racial zoning and the lack of
protective zoning around Village Creek residents from the chemical plant
indicate the result of conflating blacks with nuisances at two critical points
in time: relegating blacks to the floodplain around the creek under Jim Crow
and approving zoning measures that would allow the chemical plant to
locate near the community. 293
Cheryl Harris has argued that “[e]ven though the law is neither
uniform nor explicit in all instances, in protecting settled expectations based
on white privilege, American law has recognized a property interest in
whiteness.”294 Even after courts struck down many Southern cities’ racial
zoning ordinances, urban planners in cities like Birmingham still made
decisions based on these maps and lines of demarcation. 295 Thus, city
leaders still protected white residents’ expectation for protective zoning in
an unexplicit way even after the courts struck down explicit justifications.
This confinement created “settled expectations” that whites refused to
disturb because the power to exploit these conditions protected from the
undesirable land uses that could be driven into black neighborhoods. 296 The
290
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protection of these “settled expectations” has also had the same durability.
Privilege—particularly white racial privilege in this context—is a “modern
characteristic of racial exclusion” and “the character of resistance to racial
inclusion.”297 Many white individuals on the other side of the proverbial
and literal tracks “want to keep the situation they bought, which they
understand as access to middle-class opportunities” and may defend “a
‘right’ to accumulated privilege” that discounts the value of integration.298
Racial zoning ordinances established for a community that “whiteness was
the predicate for attaining a host of societal privileges, in both public and
private spheres.”299 Protective zoning has continued to function as a
“societal privilege” from which whites benefited, but which the local
government denied blacks. Providing protective zoning to all communities
would require a more equitable distribution of undesirable land uses within
a region. The settled expectations that decades of unchecked anti-black
land use policies have created make it difficult to redistribute these burdens
through a process of public decision making.
C. Disproportionate Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses (LULUs)
Scientific research consistently demonstrates that “[e]nvironmental
hazards are inequitably distributed in the United States with poor people
and people of color bearing a greater share of the pollution than richer
people and white people.”300 This racial disparity results from the
extremely high levels of spatial segregation that African Americans
experience.301 The assignment of black residents to particular areas
provided policymakers an opportunity to steer multiple undesirable land
uses that other residents would protest into those areas. It provided a space
in which the state had obtained complete control over the areas where the
most politically disempowered members of the community could live that
the siting of a LULU in those areas would have few, if any, political or
economic consequences.
Environmental justice advocates have long argued that government
officials and private corporations deliberately place undesirable land uses
like waste facilities in minority neighborhoods, or at a minimum, they
reason that it had “obligations to the Adamsville citizens to adhere to the expressway route
boundary.” Id.
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choose sites for these facilities in ways that result in minority
neighborhoods hosting a disproportionate share of these land uses.302
Notably, multiple studies in the 1990s and the 2000s focusing on particular
cities, counties, and regions in the South came to the same conclusion after
analyzing the correlation between the location of LULUs and the
demographics of neighborhoods that host them. 303
Thus, it remains clear that “[r]ace continues to be a powerful and
frequently used tool to sort physical space, guide public policy, and
distribute public benefits and burdens.”304 Just as a number of local
governments have historically assigned and confined black communities in
undesirable areas, they have also disproportionately sited facilities that have
produced harmful and lasting negative impacts within black communities.
Indeed, from a race-neutral standpoint, it is difficult to determine a fair
method of siting LULUs that does not overburden any one particular
community or group.305 The establishment of “group areas,” under the
logic of apartheid South Africa, makes the decision of where to locate
undesirable land uses rather predictable. Racial zoning established
decidedly “disfavored quarters,” to borrow Sheryll Cashin’s formulation of
“favored quarters.”306 These areas became the locations toward which city
302
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planners could direct the necessary but unpleasant facilities that make cities
livable for the broader population, including landfills, factories, and electric
plants. The sections of the city that take on the burden of living near these
undesirable land uses “often subsidize and are negatively impacted by the
growth of the favored quarter.”307 Many city officials have often avoided
not-in-my-backyardism (NIMBYism) by applying what Robert Bullard
calls the “place-in-blacks’-backyard (PIBBY) principle.”308 The legacy of
racial zoning might well be referred to as rampant PIBBYism. Two
common types of LULUs that have ignited the environmental justice
movement are hazardous waste facilities and highways.
1. Hazardous Waste Facilities
Black communities are vulnerable to receiving a disproportionate
share of LULUs because of the lack of protective zoning and their
economically marginalized status. In Dumping Dixie: Race, Class, and
Environmental Quality, environmental justice scholar and activist Robert
Bullard profiles the impact of environmental exploitation on black
communities in the South.309 After the decline of de jure segregation, the
South began to experience unprecedented economic growth.310 Cities and
states reached out to corporations and manufacturing plants and encouraged
them to relocate in the South with many inducements, including fewer
business regulations, low business taxes, and “an eager and docile labor
force.”311 Localities competed to recruit clean industries, but some were
forced to accept offers from dirty, high-pollution industries or no industry

In most American metropolitan regions there are high-growth,
developing suburbs that typically represent about a quarter of the entire
regional population but that also tend to capture the largest share of the
region's public infrastructure investments and job growth. Yet, through
retention of local powers, the favored quarter is able to avoid taking on
any of the region's social service burdens. Marginalized populations,
particularly the minority poor who are relegated to poverty-ridden,
central city neighborhoods, are largely excluded from participating in
the favored quarter’s economic prosperity.
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at all.312 The South became known as the Sunbelt, but its majority-black
counties were referred to as the “Black Belt.”313 High-skilled labor
employers, including tech companies, sought out areas with an educated,
mostly white labor force and avoided areas with a high percentage of “poor
and unskilled blacks.”314 Majority-black areas also had to choose between
dirty industry and no industry.315
In addition, the leaders in many black communities did not
recognize the larger, long-term implications of locating industries that
produce high pollution into their area. For many leaders, who were veterans
of the Civil Rights Movement, unemployment and low-income housing
were more important social issues than the environment.316 Often, polluting
industries settled in poor communities with little say from local leaders. 317
When dissent did arise, however, many black leaders maintained
development as the priority, despite its consequences.318 “Environmental
risks were offered as unavoidable trade-offs for jobs and a broadened tax
base in economically depressed communities.
Jobs were real;
319
environmental risks were unknown.”
Companies with a long history of
312
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pollution took advantage of this position. 320 For many industrial firms, the
black community was “a push-over lacking community organization,
environmental consciousness, and with strong and blind pro-business
politics.”321
This pro-business mindset from city leaders and black community
leaders has led to glaring siting disparities within and near-black residential
areas in the South. In 1987, the United Church of Christ’s Commission for
Racial Justice (CRJ) conducted a nationwide analysis of the areas
surrounding commercial hazardous-waste facilities.322 The study identified
a substantial correlation between the number of commercial hazardous
waste facilities in a zip code and the percentage of minorities in the zip
code’s population.323 “The percentage of minorities in areas with one
operating facility was almost twice that of areas without facilities. As the
number or noxiousness of facilities in a neighborhood increased, so did the
percentage of minorities in that neighborhood.” 324 CRJ conducted the study
again in 1994 using 1990 census data, and it found the same result.325 Many
black communities, however, find that these environmental hazards cause
more harm than good.
Law professor Vicki Been has provided a different account of the
problem. Based on Been’s analysis of studies from CRJ and others, she
concluded that there was “absolutely no evidence that the siting process
caused any current disproportion in the percentages of racial or ethnic
minorities or the poor living in host neighborhoods.”326 According to Been,
the research left open the possibility that the sites for the
facilities originally were chosen in a manner that was neither
intentionally discriminatory nor discriminatory in effect, but
that market responses to the facilities led the host
neighborhoods to become disproportionately populated by
the poor, and by racial and ethnic minorities. 327
She offered a theory to explain this possibility in which members of a
community who perceived the facility as a nuisance would choose to leave
320
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if they could afford to do so.328 The out-migration and the decrease in
property values that the undesirable land use caused would lead individuals
with limited housing choices because of racial discrimination in the housing
market to move in. 329 Over time, the percentage of racial and ethnic
minorities would increase to a higher percentage than it had been prior to
the siting of the facility.330
The legacy of racial zoning, however, challenges this conclusion
where local governments designated land in which African Americans
could reside and limited their residential options to neighborhoods in these
areas. Siting decisions made after these designations took place occurred
in a context in which the demographics of the area had been set by law.
Discrimination in the residential housing market, even after the fall of racial
zoning ordinances, limited the mobility options of African Americans
outside of these areas.331 Consequently, the salience of out-migration
lessened as the population that had the means to move and who could
acquire housing outside of the designated black areas remained limited. 332
Likewise, the explanation of an increase in African Americans that takes
place as a result of in-migration due to limited options fails to take into
account a scenario in which African Americans are assigned to a particular
community by law and local governments reproduce and fortify these
policies and designations for an extended period of time.
The environmental justice literature has become increasingly
complex in its examination of whether the disproportionate number of
hazardous land uses in minority communities comes from intentional siting
decisions or minority housing choices, and scholars have yet to reach a
consensus on the matter. 333 Nonetheless, at least in the context of a city
which had once adopted racial zoning policies, the theory that the
neighborhood forced to endure one or more undesirable land uses is
predominantly African American as a result of “market dynamics” becomes
less compelling.
328

Id. at 6-7 (citing Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority
Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383,
1388-90 (1994)).
329
Id.
330
Id.
331
See Rabin, Expulsive Zoning: The Inequitable Legacy of Euclid, in ZONING
AND THE AMERICAN DREAM, supra note 11, at 102 (“Because it appears that such areas
were mainly black, and because whites who may have been similarly displaced were not
subject to racially determined limitations in seeking alternative housing, the adverse
impacts of expulsive zoning on blacks were far more severe . . . .”); Godsil, supra note 3,
at 553-54.
332
See id.
333
See DORCETA E. TAYLOR, TOXIC COMMUNITIES: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM,
INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION, AND RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY 41 (2014).
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The current environmental regulatory regime does little to undo
these practices. Instead, it further entrenches the impact of these past
decisions. Several environmental laws provide for the “grandfathering” of
facilities that operated prior to the enactment of the law, protecting them
from substantive regulation. 334 For example, the grandfathering provision
in the Clean Air Act has had the most significant impact on black
communities because the dirtiest facilities that emit the highest amounts of
pollution were constructed prior to the 1970s, disproportionately in black
communities.335 To make matters worse, federal and state governments
have yielded real authority over where third parties can site most polluting
facilities to local governments. 336 This devolution of control has serious
implications in a local government context where the spatial layout of racial
demographics in the city grows out of a context of state-imposed racial
segregation, and a void of public policy solutions to remedy this division
remains. The opportunity for a local government to take advantage of these
conditions is high.
Legal scholars have often focused on measures designed to keep
low-income people of color out of higher-income, disproportionately white
communities. It is important to frame undesirable land uses as tools that
keep higher-income and disproportionately white individuals out of lowerincome communities of color in order to perpetuate racial segregation. Lior
Jacob Strahilevitz has analyzed “exclusionary amenities,” or features of
residential developments that are generally expensive and that only appeal
to certain demographic groups. 337 Strahilevitz points toward club goods,
such as residential elevators, concierges, and tennis courts, and local public
goods as examples of exclusionary amenities. 338 The ability of a desirable
club good or public good to deter unwanted potential residents—including
poor people and people of color—from moving into a certain area can also
apply in reverse. An undesirable land use as an “amenity” that local city
planners and business interests can direct into a neighborhood deters highincome or white individuals from moving into that area. A tennis court may
attract, while a factory can repel. The deployment of undesirable land uses
to keep racial groups apart gives that use a segregative effect.

334

Godsil, supra note 12, at 1869; see also Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, If Your
Grandfather Could Pollute, So Can You: Environmental “Grandfather Clauses” and
Their Role in Environmental Inequity, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 131, 134-35 (1995).
335
Id.
336
See Godsil, supra note 12, at 1869.
337
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities,
92 VA. L. REV. 437 (2006).
338
Id. at 441.
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2. Highways
Racial zoning and its aftermath constitute a form of contemporary
structural inequality. The permanence of the location of black communities
explicitly on the basis of race represents a vestige of overt racial
discrimination. The facially colorblind policies that local governments
applied in making zoning decisions and the disproportionate siting of
LULUs in or near black communities have contributed to “the
sedimentation of intergenerational privilege.”339 The aftermath of racial
zoning involves a link between the logic of race-based decision making that
characterized explicit racial zoning and forms of localism that “reproduce
resource and residential segregation without using explicitly racial
rules.”340
For example, the location of Overtown, a neighborhood that grew
out of Miami’s racial zoning ordinance, made it possible to direct the
building of Interstate 95 through the community. 341
The black
community’s designated location required it to shoulder the burden of a
highway that filled the air with pollution and noise while protecting
majority-white or higher income communities from the same. 342 In
Birmingham, Alabama, city and state officials ensured that Interstate 59
would be built along 11th Avenue, on a route that matches the boundary for
the black community under the city’s racial zoning ordinance.343 The city
also built Interstate 65 along the lines of its racial zoning ordinance,344
“creating a buffer between white and Black communities.” 345 Sarah
Schindler argues that “the built environment controls human behavior.”346
Buildings and uses within low-income communities of color certainly
influence the behavior of individuals who examine the residential options
that they have in a community and who explicitly choose not to reside in
the area with these negative features of the built environment.347 As
339

Troutt, supra note 233, at 77.
Id.
341
See Archer, supra note 14, at 1278-80 (discussing the development of
Overtown and city leaders’ use of the Interstate Highway Act “to seize Overtown and push
out Black residents”).
342
See Archer, supra note 14, at 1280.
343
Id. at 1281-83 (citing CONNERLY, supra note 161, at 104).
344
Id.
345
Id. at 1283; see also Sarah Schindler, Architectural Exclusion: Discrimination
and Segregation Through Physical Design of the Built Environment, 124 YALE L.J. 1934,
1939 (2015) (highlighting the ways in which techniques like the location of highways “can
shape the demographics of a city and isolate a neighborhood from those surrounding it,
often intentionally”).
346
Schindler, supra note 345, at 1947.
347
Id.
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Lawrence Lessig has observed, “[t]hat a highway divides two
neighborhoods limits the extent to which the neighborhoods integrate . . . .
[C]onstraints function in a way that shapes behavior. In this way, they too
regulate.”348
The exclusionary impact of structural devices like highways
“cement racial inequality.”349 They can outlast current law, facilitate racial
exclusion, and work around future laws that might otherwise facilitate
integration.350 In the same way, racial zoning ordinances functioned to
create conditions of confinement that would outlast the legally permissible
existence of the zoning ordinance. Architectural decisions, including where
to build highways, have literally monumental staying power.351 In the
words of Robert Moses, a New York public official who advocated for the
use of highways to form barriers to access for people of color, “It’s very
hard to tear down a bridge once it’s up.”352 “While outdated laws are often
overturned when the norms informing them have sufficiently evolved, our
exclusionary built environment, which was created in the past, continues to
regulate in the present.”353
3. Redistributing the Burdens
The inertia that characterizes the legacy of racial zoning requires an
interruption that exposes the longstanding policy choices that have led to
directing undesirable land uses into or near formerly racially zoned black
communities. The concept of a Pigovian tax may serve as a tangible
response to this pattern. In her 1979 article, Michelle J. White analyzed
several potential policies to limit the severity and spread of exclusionary
zoning and growth controls that suburbs enact to the detriment of the
broader metropolitan area. 354 While scholars have discussed applying this
348

Lawrence Lessig, Commentary, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might
Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 507 (1999).
349
Archer, supra note 14, at 1275.
350
See id.
351
Schindler, supra note 345, at 1942-43.
352
See Archer, supra note 14, at 1275 (quoting Matthew Noah Smith, Reliance
Structures: How Urban Public Policy Shapes Human Agency, in THE PALGRAVE
HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC POLICY 809, 812 (David Boonin ed., 2018)).
353
Schindler, supra note 345, at 1941.
354
Michelle J. White, Suburban Growth Controls: Liability Rules and Pigovian
Taxes, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 207, 209 (1979). Richard Ford has also applied the concept of
Pigovian taxes to address higher-income communities’ refusals to accept affordable
housing developments and instead steer a disproportionate amount to other areas, including
inner city areas in the region. See Ford, supra note 95, at 1902, 1902 n.190 (citing White,
among others). Cities and private landowners have often treated affordable housing
developments as nuisances. See, e.g., Maureen E. Brady, Turning Neighbors into
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remedy to zoning measures in one jurisdiction that affect neighboring
jurisdictions, it may be appropriate to use if one considers the “favored
quarter”355 and the “disfavored quarter” in the context of neighborhoods
within a particular city. Under this approach, undesirable land uses are the
classic sorts of nuisances that indeed can cause air and/or water pollution
and which have “negative external effects on other parties.”356 The only
difference is that the producer of the nuisance is a local government rather
than a private party.
One might frame a local government’s approval of the siting of the
undesirable land use in a majority-minority section of the city with a
disproportionate number of LULUs already cited in it as the creation of a
nuisance in itself, over and above the nuisances that already exist in the
area. A standard economic remedy for nuisances is the Pigovian tax, which
gives nuisance creators a choice between paying a tax per unit of nuisance
or ceasing to create the nuisance. 357 The tax functions as a mechanism that
encourages policymakers and stakeholders in the favored quarter to think
twice before compounding the history of undesirable land use sitings in
formerly racially zoned black communities.358 The tax is intended to
discourage disproportionate siting decisions by requiring the “favored
quarter” to pay a price for it.359 In this context, the tax may be a shift in the
allocation of funding for improvements in the favored quarter to provide
those resources to the former racially zoned black community to
compensate for the additional burden of an undesirable land use. 360
In some ways, mechanisms like a Pigovian tax which externalize
the costs of undesirable land uses by more evenly distributing the burdens
Nuisances, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1609, 1614 (2021) (describing efforts to use zoning and
nuisance law to limit the building of multifamily housing since the early twentieth
century). Indeed, in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)—the
Supreme Court decision upholding zoning as a legitimate use of a local government’s
regulatory powers—the majority suggested that an apartment in a single-family
neighborhood was a “parasite” and “may be merely a right thing in the wrong place, like
a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.” Id. at 388, 394. This unfortunate parallel
suggests that the application of a nuisance tax to a disproportionate siting of undesirable
land uses—which are classic nuisances rather than racialized ones—may lead us down a
useful path.
355
See Cashin, supra note 306, at 1987.
356
White, supra note 354, at 209.
357
Id. at 209-10.
358
Id.
359
Id.
360
This approach of assigning funds to a local government for a particular use as
part of this regime is consistent with White’s formulation of how the payment would be
used: “[W]hile the damage awards under a community liability rule are paid to owners of
vacant land, the Pigovian tax is paid to a higher level of government, presumably a regional
or metropolitan body.” Id. at 210.
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associated with them can open the door to considering remedies that do not
simply focus on redeveloping the racially zoned neighborhood on its own.
Policymakers and advocates must place the racially zoned neighborhood
within the broader context of the city and region within which it is located.
Audrey McFarlane has critiqued the focus on development within urban
policy geared toward addressing poverty in inner-city communities.361 She
argues that “economic development is not a neutral policy that government
can advance without addressing significant structural issues that externally
impact inner-city communities.”362 According to McFarlane, “rather than
an exclusively localized approach, a dialectical perspective, one that
understands a local community both as a totality in itself and as part of a
larger totality, is called for.”363 Distributing the results of the costs that
cities and regions have required these communities to bear can provide a
remedy that benefits the racially zoned neighborhood, but also challenges
the context which creates that neighborhood’s structural disadvantages.
V. THE ROLE OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
The maintenance of a pattern in which African Americans
disproportionately remain in the areas designated for them under racial
zoning ordinances—despite the fact that the era of the direct application of
the ordinances is long gone—is a “material manifestation”364 of Derrick
Bell’s thesis regarding the “permanence of racism” in American society. 365
Like the interstate highways that soar over the black communities that they
destroyed, the enduring pattern of African Americans locked in these
communities where they still suffer from disinvestment and the vestiges of
factories, landfills, and other uses incompatible with a livable residential
area is a “physical realization of our racialized norms and values.” 366
The location of black communities, the lack of protective zoning,
and the disproportionate siting of LULUs in low-income black
communities—the three challenges identified above—are challenges tied
to specific spaces. They result from the spatial limitations in which
segregated cities confined black residents as a result of racial zoning
ordinances and policies that flowed from them. The latter two issues related
361
See Audrey G. McFarlane, Race, Space, and Place: The Geography of
Economic Development, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 295 (1999).
362
Id. at 299.
363
Id. at 301.
364
Archer, supra note 14, at 1267.
365
See DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE
PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992) (contending that racism is ingrained in American
society).
366
Archer, supra note 14, at 1267.
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to zoning protections and land uses suggest that a nuisance law solution
could remedy them. It has become clear, however, that “nuisance actions
are no longer a reliable way to protect homes from noxious land uses.”367
The growth of land use and environmental regulations has become a reason
upon which courts have relied to justify the refusal to grant injunctive relief
or allow nuisance cases to survive motions to dismiss.368 In theory, this
web of rules should allow residents of affected communities to avoid the
need for nuisance actions. 369 The laws that were designed to segregate
conflicting uses and limit overall levels of air and water pollution should
provide the protective zoning that these communities lack and manage the
effects of undesirable land uses; yet they have failed at this task.370
The logic of racial zoning that often governs local government
decision making about ways to externalize undesirable land uses away from
majority white, high-opportunity communities will become increasingly
unworkable. David Troutt has argued that threats to social equity, including
racial re-segregation, threaten the sustainability of a region because “the
costs of regional inequalities can no longer be contained in poorer areas, as
burdens multiply with population trends.”371
The legacy of racial zoning as outlined above calls into question the
effectiveness of the legal tools available to remedy the effects of past
discrimination and undo the ways in which the logic of racial zoning
informed land use regulations and local government policies tend to
respond to majority-black neighborhoods. This Part argues that the current
understanding of the scope of the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the
problems to which it applies must broaden to encompass the effect of
historical concentrations of black communities in the most undesirable land
in the city due to its environmental risk and the cumulative effect of a failure
to provide protective zoning and disproportionate siting of LULUs in these
concentrated areas. These factors limit access to opportunity for black
residents within individual towns and cities vis-a-vis white neighborhoods
within the same town or city. They are housing issues—not just land use
issues—and must be treated as such. They raise pressing fair housing
implications because “environmental concerns mix with concerns about
employment access and wealth maximization (property value) to limit
opportunity.”372 While these conditions are not limited to formerly racially
367

Godsil, supra note 12, at 1810.
See id.
369
See id.
370
See, e.g., id. at 1811 (explaining that “these legislative and regulatory advances
[addressing industrial pollution] have ignored some neighborhoods”).
371
Troutt, supra note 233, at 79.
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zoned cities in the South, they appear within the structure of residential
segregation and disadvantage in Southern towns and cities more frequently
as a result of the legacy and logic of racial zoning that continued in the
application of general zoning ordinances for decades.373 They also provide
an often-ignored landscape in which to consider how effectively the Fair
Housing Act can work in targeting another iteration of racialized
disadvantage.
A. The Effectiveness of the Fair Housing Act
Scholars have argued that the FHA and Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964374—two of the civil rights laws that most directly apply to
challenging governmental and private market decisions that further racial
disparities in housing and community development—have proven
insufficient in remedying the structural racism. 375 These results, however,
seem far from the ambitions of the FHA’s original proponents. Congress
clearly indicated in Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, commonly
referred to as the FHA, that the FHA’s intention is “to provide, within
constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States.” 376
Broadly speaking, the FHA prohibits discrimination in the sale, rental, and
financing of dwellings on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial
status, national origin, and disability. 377 Courts have made clear, however,
that the FHA “prohibits ‘both direct discrimination and practices with

See Prakash, supra note 10, at 1449 (arguing that Euclid “codified the rationale
of zoning proponents that separating land uses was necessary to protect property value,
and laid the legal foundation for a system that fulfilled much the same purpose as racial
zoning.”) (footnotes omitted).
374
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the basis
of race, color, and national origin in programs receiving federal financial assistance. 42
U.S.C. § § 2000d-2000d-7 (2012).
375
See Robert G. Schwemm, Private Enforcement and the Fair Housing Act, 6
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 384 (1988) (“[I]ndividual litigation victories rarely can
address large-scale patterns and practices of discrimination.”); see also John O. Calmore,
Race/ism Lost and Found: The Fair Housing Act at Thirty, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1067,
1127 (1998) (“The rights-based strategy of fair housing, as enforced by HUD and in the
courts, is an ideological victory that nonetheless has had insignificant effects in
desegregating the metropolis and thereby improving the material life of the ghetto poor.”);
Archer, supra note 14, at 1305, 1305 n.275 (2020) (arguing that courts have primarily
interpreted Title VI and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “to apply to
discriminatory decisions after they have been made, place the burden of proof on members
of the impacted community rather than on government agencies, and are applied against a
legal backdrop that focuses on intent and ignores structural and systemic concerns”).
376
42 U.S.C. § 3601.
377
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significant discriminatory effects’ on the availability of housing.” 378
Several scholars have argued that fair housing law relies on two core
themes, which David Troutt has described as “anti-discrimination and antisegregation.”379 Olatunde Johnson addresses these two ideas in the context
of rethinking the “overly narrow conceptions of the FHA’s enforcement
power.”380 The “public and private capacity to resolve discrimination
claims” encompasses the anti-discrimination element of fair housing law.381
The anti-discrimination aspect of fair housing law, however, became the
dominant force through the 1970s to 1990s. 382 The focus on the
individualized enforcement of anti-discrimination rights unnecessarily
limits the tools available to achieve fair housing. 383
The meaning of fair housing and its scope are long overdue for
reconsideration. “‘Fair housing’ is a far more comprehensive term than
commonly understood.”384 Indeed, the FHA actually expanded the right to
equal housing opportunities already enshrined in 42 U.S.C. § 1982, one of
the so-called Reconstruction Amendments.385 As David Troutt has
cogently stated in his leading article on the subject: “Since World War II,
housing policy has been fundamentally concerned with economic
378

S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 254 F. Supp. 2d
486, 499 (D.N.J. 2003) [hereinafter SCCIA III] (quoting Southend Neighborhood
Improvement Ass’n v. County of St. Clair, 743 F.2d 1207, 1209 (7th Cir. 1994)); see also
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).
379
See Troutt, supra note 233, at 7. Robert Schwemm frames these two goals in
terms of the remedies they sought. Robert G. Schwemm, Cox, Halprin, and Discriminatory
Municipal Services Under the Fair Housing Act, 41 IND. L. REV. 717, 718 (2008) (“The
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(citations omitted); see also United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1101
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Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 provides: “All citizens of the United
States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as it is enjoyed by white
citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property.” Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (later codified at 42 U.S.C.
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applicable to a broad range of discriminatory practices and enforceable by a complete
arsenal of federal authority.” Id. at 416-17 (emphasis added).
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opportunity. In the twenty-first century, I argue, fair housing law is
fundamentally about reducing economic inequality.”386 The prongs of antidiscrimination and anti-segregation go beyond a focus on housing alone. 387
Together, they “advance an interest in fair housing that encompasses
virtually any institutional means that connects people’s residential status to
social and economic mobility.”388
David Troutt argues that the scope of the FHA can and should be
read to include issues beyond just housing, namely “because the antighettoization/integration interests that were earlier understood to be at the
heart of the Act’s passage have had important, though limited, success
across a changed landscape.”389 The evolution of the law governing urban
development from the Housing Act of 1949 to the FHA of 1968 illustrates
an increasingly more nuanced understanding of the causes of the deleterious
conditions in majority-minority urban neighborhoods.390 The Third
Circuit’s opinion in Shannon v. U.S. Department of Housing & Urban
Development (HUD) compellingly describes this shift:
In 1949 the Secretary, in examining whether a plan presented
by a [Local Public Agency] included a workable program for
community improvement, could not act unconstitutionally,
but possibly could act neutrally on the issue of racial
segregation. By 1964 he was directed, when considering
whether a program of community development was
workable, to look at the effects of local planning action and
to prevent discrimination in housing resulting from such
action. In 1968 he was directed to act affirmatively to
achieve fair housing. Whatever were the most significant
features of a workable program for community improvement
in 1949, by 1964 such a program had to be
nondiscriminatory in its effects, and by 1968 the Secretary
had to affirmatively promote fair housing. 391
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This discussion of a review of a HUD grantee’s plan to determine
whether it “included a workable program for community improvement”
poses a unique scenario that is rather different from many cases under the
FHA that seek anti-segregation reform. The court discusses “a program for
community development” that requires HUD to consider “the effects of
local planning action.” Rather than focus on housing itself, it requires
accountability for community development—the core focal point for legacy
racial zoning practices. It describes a circumstance in which a local
government could take any number of development-based approaches to
develop a plan to implement solutions to the legacies of racial zoning
described above. A local government may develop a plan designed to
support individuals living in sections of cities previously designated for
black residents (which may still remain predominantly black) that are in
flood zones by moving to higher ground or remediating their properties to
make them more resilient against flooding. Likewise, it may change its
zoning designations to protect the residential character of majority-minority
areas. It may also adopt a plan to incentivize owners of harmful land uses
that have been located in historically black neighborhoods of the city to
move to more suitable locations.
Yet the incidence of cases like these within the spectrum of systemic
challenges to violations of the FHA is rare.392 Indeed, many of the leading
cases grow out of the urban-suburban context of the northern United States
that dominates the literature. 393 Many of the most notable instances of

See Troutt, supra note 233, at 30-31. Troutt distinguishes “between cases
brought to end discrimination in housing and cases brought to effectuate more systemic
desegregation” and places them at different ends of a spectrum. Id. These ends of the
spectrum fall within the “anti-discrimination” vs. “anti-segregation” framework. Id.
393
Indeed, David Troutt suggests that there is an over-emphasis on the South in
the context of understanding civil rights history. Troutt, supra note 233, at 16. “One
problem with our collective grasp of the civil rights struggles of the 1960s, filtered as they
are through the grain of black and white photographs and the imaginations of Hollywood
writers, is that we tend to frame from the South.” Id. He argues that “the story had moved
North” as a result of the Great Migration out of African Americans out of the South during
and around World Wars I and II. Id. According to Troutt, “the ‘ghetto’ was a northern city
phenomenon, where the cumulative marginalizing effects of redlining, urban renewal, and
public housing had become the singular experience of African American life and struggle.”
Id. While the conventional narrative of the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s may
revolve around events in the South, the story of housing segregation is not at the heart of
this story at all, whether in the South or the North. Indeed, the FHA of 1968 is the last of
the civil rights statutes passed in this era. It is also important to pull back the lens of “the
story” of equal housing rights. Not all of the people “had moved North.” Black people
remained in the South. Their neighbors in the North did not create a “singular experience.”
The black Southern experience continues to present its own unique set of challenges. It
deserves equal analysis and targeted attention. The myopic view of housing segregation
392
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systemic FHA litigation do not involve challenges to spatial dimensions of
segregation that more commonly exist outside of the South. The cases
involving mobility for public housing residents often “span the entire
history of the FHA and have come to crystalize the goals of anti-segregative
systemic lawsuits.”394 In Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, the
court ordered the Chicago Housing Authority to change its racially
discriminatory tenant assignment and selection policies and instead place
low-income families in high-opportunity and low-minority areas.395 “As a
matter of both fair housing law and policy, Gautreaux stands for the
proposition that the benefit of fair housing entails mobility to areas of
(suburban) high opportunity.”396 The emphasis here belongs on the
remedy’s “suburban” context.
Similarly, in Thompson v. HUD, which was filed more than twenty
years after Gautreaux, the plaintiffs challenged the racial segregation that
resulted in years of the city of Baltimore’s discriminatory public housing
siting policies. 397 They argued that HUD’s “failure adequately to consider
a regional approach to desegregation of public housing” violated the
agency’s obligation to administer its programs in a manner to affirmatively
further fair housing policy.398 The court determined that HUD was liable
for “effectively wearing blinders” to options to desegregate that included a
regional approach that encompassed surrounding higher-income, majoritywhite counties.399 According to Troutt, “[t]he theory of fair housing in
[Thompson] may be the most complete demonstration of systemic litigation
in the anti-segregation vein.”400
Several early cases brought under the FHA also include challenges
to the efforts of suburbs to “maintain the ghetto on the other side of
municipal boundaries.”401 For example, in United States v. City of Parma,
HUD challenged an all-white Ohio suburb’s policies aimed at keeping out
low-income people of color by opposing all forms of public and affordable
housing, enacting exclusionary zoning ordinances, rejecting a federally
from the urban-suburban divide in the North figures heavily into the tendency to ignore
the barriers to fair housing choice in other parts of the nation.
394
Troutt, supra note 233, at 38.
395
304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
396
Troutt, supra note 233, at 39.
397
348 F. Supp. 2d 398 (D. Md. 2005).
398
Id. at 408 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5)).
399
Id. at 409.
400
Troutt, supra note 233, at 39.
401
See Troutt, supra note 233, at 37; see also, e.g., United States v. Black Jack,
508 F.2d 1179, 1181 (8th Cir. 1974) (challenging exclusionary zoning ordinances passed
by a nearly all-white suburb of St. Louis, Missouri, designed to prevent the construction
of housing affordable to predominately black ghettoes in St. Louis); United States v. City
of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
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subsidized low-income housing development, and refusing to comply with
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) requirements.402 Still, the
urban-suburban context remains a consistent setting in which advocates
have attempted to leverage the FHA’s power for systemic change.
While many leading FHA systemic cases involve challenges to
suburbs’ resistance to integration from people of color in the urban centers
in their region, they are still instructive for imagining a broader set of facts
that may include legacies of racial zoning. In Texas Department of Housing
and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., the U.S.
Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that disparate impact claims are
cognizable under the FHA.403 The case focused on a tension between the
federal Low-Income Housing Tax Credit program—which specifically
provides for the construction of affordable housing in already low-income
areas—and the FHA.404 The Court held that the FHA’s statutory objectives
took priority.405 The Court recognized and anticipated the artful way in
which discrimination shape-shifts and the need to have a theory that was
similarly flexible.406 The Court stated, “[i]t permits plaintiffs to counteract
unconscious prejudices and disguised animus that escape easy classification
as disparate treatment. In this way disparate-impact liability may prevent
segregated housing patterns that might otherwise result from covert and
illicit stereotyping.”407
The institutional forms of exclusion objected to in the urbansuburban cases also play out within sections of towns and cities as well. Of
course, former racially zoned cities in the South and border states currently
share the challenge of suburban sprawl with their large counterparts outside
of the South.408
Nonetheless, the long-standing effects of racial
concentrations and the disproportionate allocation of burdens like LULUs
402

494 F. Supp. at 1051-52.
576 U.S. 519 (2015).
404
See id. at 525 (discussing 26 U.S.C. § 42(m)(1)(B)(ii)(III), (d)(5)(ii)(I)).
405
Id. at 546-47.
406
See Troutt, supra note 233, at 43.
407
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. at 540.
408
Indeed, Atlanta and Dallas—two cities that had actual racial-zoning
ordinances—are among the fastest-growing cities in the nation. See Zach Levitt & Jess
Eng, Where America’s developed areas are growing: ‘Way off into the horizon’, WASH.
POST (Aug. 11, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/interactive/2021/landdevelopment-urban-growth-maps/. They are among the many American cities that struggle
with sprawl and an increasing urban-suburban divide. See id.; see also Emily Badger, What
the rapidly urbanizing Southeast could look like come 2060, WASH. POST (July 30, 2014,
3:27
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/07/30/what-therapidly-urbanizing-southeast-could-look-like-come-2060/ (describing the long-term
consequences for sprawl in cities like Atlanta, Birmingham, and Miami, including its
impact on social mobility).
403
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to majority-black areas within specific sections of the city still remain. 409
Likewise, rural communities that strictly regulated where African
Americans could live have similar structures.410 Even outside of the urbansuburban context, majority-white sections within towns and cities also resist
public or subsidized low-income housing developments. 411 These same
cities also may disproportionately use CDBG funds to build new amenities
in higher-income sections of the city while providing low-income sections
within the same city less than their fair share of funding.412 Litigants
409

See Linda Villarosa, Pollution Is Killing Black Americans. This Community
Fought
Back.,
N.Y.
TIMES
MAG.
(July
28,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/28/magazine/pollution-philadelphia-blackamericans.html (noting that “African-Americans are seventy-five percent more likely than
others to live near facilities that produce hazardous waste”).
410
See TAYLOR, supra note 333, at 35-37 (discussing studies which found that
hazardous waste landfills were disproportionately sited in low-income black communities
across the South). Many of the towns which studies have found suffered from the
disproportionate siting of LULUs are historically black towns that started as separate
enclaves like Princeville, North Carolina, because of white restriction from residing safely
in other areas. For example, Alsen, Louisiana, was the site of the fourth largest hazardous
waste facility in the United States. See, e.g., Robert B. Wiygul et al., Environmental Justice
in Rural Communities, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 405, 411 n.16 (1994). The town is more than
ninety-five percent black. See id. The town started as a settlement for freed slaves after the
Civil War, and it was forced out of its original location when chemical plants started
coming in. See id. at 441-42. Emelle, Alabama, is home to the nation’s largest commercial
hazardous waste landfill. See Bullard, supra note 303, at 25. Around the time of the siting,
the town was more than ninety percent black in a county that was seventy-five percent
black. See id. Before the Civil War, nearly half of Emelle’s residents were slaves. See
Kelly D. Alley et al., The Historical Transformation of a Grassroots Environmental
Group, 54 HUMAN ORG, 410 (1995). Sharecropping kept black residents essentially bound
to the land and in poverty. See id.
411
See, e.g., SHERYLL CASHIN, WHITE SPACE, BLACK HOOD: OPPORTUNITY
HOARDING AND SEGREGATION IN THE AGE OF INEQUALITY 53-54 (2021) (describing the
methods that white residents of Chicago neighborhoods used to keep blacks out of these
areas and the city’s decision to concentrate low-income black residents into a series of
high-rise housing projects outside of the neighborhoods that intensely opposed them). The
federal government also historically built racially segregated public housing complexes in
separate areas or directed local governments to do the same, allegedly to reflect white
preferences in the respective cities. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 31, at 16-32.
412
See Brett Theodos et al., Taking Stock of the Community Development Block
Grant,
URB.
INST.,
8
(Apr.
2017),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/89551/cdbg_brief.pdf (noting, for
example, that studies show higher-income neighborhoods in lower-income council
districts in Los Angeles received more funds than lower-income neighborhoods in higherincome districts). There is no reliable data on how well jurisdictions direct funding to lowand moderate-income areas as required by the Housing and Community Development Act,
which established the program. See id. at 9. There is also very little targeted spending on
CDBG funds in the highest need areas, leaving open the possibility for unequal
distributions of funds. See id.
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challenging these long-standing policies would also be able to borrow the
theory from Thompson that may allow them to overcome statute of
limitations challenges. 413 Thus, the examples of systemic FHA cases can
also inform viable strategies for challenge efforts to maintain majorityblack ghettoes within cities, particularly those communities that began as a
result of racial zoning and applications of general zoning ordinances that
mirrored the same goals by another name.
1. Barriers to Litigating Legacy Claims Under the Fair Housing Act
Indeed, judicial remedies can work to “disrupt institutional
arrangements” by challenging structures and institutional norms in
government decision making.414 The remedies available, however, in the
context of the environmental results of racist location decisions for black
communities, the failure to provide protective zoning, and the
disproportionate siting of LULUs, are limited. Several courts have barred
post-acquisition habitability claims in ways that can limit legal theories that
involve neighborhood conditions.415 The roadblocks that these cases have
presented drive at the heart of the challenge with expanding the application
of the FHA that the language of the statute itself presents. The Fifth
Circuit’s 2005 decision in Cox v. City of Dallas 416 provides an excellent
example of the consequences of the FHA’s limited reach in tackling the
legacies of racial zoning in both the lack of protective zoning and
disproportionate siting of LULUs.
2. Post-Acquisition Habitability Claims
Cox involved an illegal dump site in the predominantly black
neighborhood of Deepwood in Dallas, Texas. 417 The City of Dallas annexed
Deepwood in 1956, when it was a predominantly white neighborhood, and

413

See Troutt, supra note 233, at 41; Thompson v. HUD, 348 F. Supp. 2d 398,
426 (D. Md. 2005) (finding that proof of a past FHA violation “would be admissible to
establish the fact of the past violation as an element of a ‘dissipation of vestiges’ claim.”).
414
Troutt, supra note 233, at 36 (citing United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ.,
624 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)).
415
See, e.g., Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 2005) (postacquisition habitability not cognizable under § 3604(b)); Halprin v. Prairie Single Family
Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327, 330 (7th Cir. 2004). But see Comm.
Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 713-15 (9th Cir. 2009)
(concerning sewer services).
416
430 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 2005).
417
Id. at 736.
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zoned it residential. 418 The City’s lack of commitment to backing up the
protection that a residential zoning designation should offer became clear
in 1963, when the City authorized operation of a gravel pit at an eighty-fiveacre site in the neighborhood. 419 After that point, the neighborhood changed
to predominantly black during the 1970s.420
During this period of transition, the owner of the gravel pit replaced
the gravel pit’s contents with solid waste.421 For over twenty-five years,
illegal dumping occurred. 422 The individuals engaged in the dumping
loaded the pit with uncovered solid waste, “including household waste,
tires, demolition debris, insulation, asphalt shingles, abandoned
automobiles, jugs and bottles labeled ‘sulfuric acid’ and ‘nitric acid,’ 55gallon drums, and syringes.”423 In 1998, Deepwood residents who had
purchased their homes between 1970 and 1978 filed two lawsuits against
the City in federal court alleging civil rights and environmental law
violations.424
The civil rights claim included allegations of race
discrimination and referred to “two sites located in . . . white neighborhoods
where the City did remedy illegal dumping and/or illegal mining” 425 despite
the city’s failure to remedy the illegal dumping in Deepwood, which the
court characterized as “inconsistent, inadequate, and largely ineffective,” 426
“erratic,” and “ineffectual.”427
The plaintiffs claimed that this
discrimination violated sections 3604(a)428 and 3604(b)429 of the FHA and

418

Id.
Id.
420
Id.
421
Id.
422
Cox v. City of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 284-85 (5th Cir. 2001).
423
Id. at 285.
424
Cox v. City of Dallas, No. Civ.A. 398CV1763BH, 2004 WL 370242, at *4
(N.D. Tex. Feb. 24, 2004), aff’d sub nom. Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734 (5th Cir.
2005) (describing procedural history of both suits). The court consolidated and later
bifurcated the two sets of claims.
425
Cox, 2004 WL 370242, at *4.
426
Cox v. City of Dallas, No. Civ.A.3:98-CV-1763BH, 2004 WL 2108253, at
*11 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2004), aff’d sub nom. Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734 (5th
Cir. 2005).
427
Cox, 430 F.3d at 737.
428
Fair Housing Act § 804(a), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2000). This section of the
FHA makes it unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or
to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a
dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national
origin.” Id.
429
Fair Housing Act § 804(b), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2000). This section of the
FHA makes it unlawful to “discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in
419
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certain HUD regulations implementing the Act which prohibits “otherwise
mak[ing] [housing] unavailable”430 and “[r]efusing to provide municipal
services.”431
The district court granted summary judgment on the FHA claims.432
It rejected the plaintiffs’ section 3604(a) claim on the ground that this
provision’s ban of discriminatory practices that “make unavailable or deny”
housing does not cover homeowners who seek to “protect intangible
interests in already-owned property, such as habitability or value.”433 The
section 3604(b) claim failed because the district court interpreted this
provision to apply “only to discrimination in the provision of services that
precludes the sale or rental of housing,” and “[p]laintiffs have not alleged
discrimination related to the acquisition of their homes.” 434 Finally, the
district court rejected the plaintiffs’ claims based on HUD’s regulations
under Section 1983 for the same reasons.435
The Fifth Circuit agreed with this reasoning, but its opinion provides
even greater insight regarding the court’s response to the plaintiffs’
ostensible ask for them to recognize a more robust understanding of the
impact of the landfill on their housing rights in the neighborhood. The
appeals court rejected the “make unavailable or deny” claim under section
3604(a), concluding that: “The failure of the City to police the Deepwood
landfill may have harmed the housing market, decreased home values, or
adversely impacted homeowners' ‘intangible interests,’ but such results do
not make dwellings ‘unavailable’ within the meaning of the Act.” 436 It also
connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national
origin.” Id.
430
This provision of HUD regulations states: “It shall be unlawful, because of
race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin, to engage in any
conduct relating to the provision of housing or of services and facilities in connection
therewith that otherwise makes unavailable or denies dwellings to persons.” 24 C.F.R. §
100.70(b).
431
The regulation prohibits “[r]efusing to provide municipal services or property
or hazard insurance for dwellings or providing such services or insurance differently
because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.” 24
C.F.R. § 100.70(d)(4). The plaintiffs also brought claims for violations of the 1866 Civil
Rights Act (specifically 42 U.S.C. § 1981), and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment (seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Cox, 430 F.3d at 736.
432
Cox, 2004 WL 370242, at *14.
433
Id. at *6 (citing Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass’n v. County of St.
Clair, 743 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir. 1984)).
434
Cox, 2004 WL 370242, at *8.
435
Id. at *9. The court also noted that there was no private right of action to
enforce the regulations: “When regulations authoritatively construe a statute, it is
‘meaningless to talk about a separate cause of action to enforce the regulations apart from
the statute.’” Id. (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 284 (2001)).
436
Cox, 430 F.3d at 740.
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concluded that “the simple language of § 3604(a) does not apply to current
homeowners whose complaint is that the value or ‘habitability’ of their
houses has decreased because such a complaint is not about
‘availability.”’437 Judge Patrick Higginbotham, writing for the majority,
recognized a potential claim for “constructive eviction” under section
3604(a) depending on the devastating effect the defendant’s discrimination
had on the homeowner.438 The current owners in Cox, however, had no
claim under section 3604(a) that “the value or ‘habitability’ of their property
had decreased due to discrimination in the delivery of protective city
services.”439
The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ section 3604(b) claim related
to the refusal of municipal services. 440 The court doubted that the City’s
action constituted a “service” under the Act and held that § 3604(b) was
inapplicable “because the service was not ‘connected’ to the sale or rental
of a dwelling as the statute requires.”441 The court feared that accepting the
plaintiffs’ argument that section 3604(b) of the Act did not require
“services” to be connected with the sale or rental of a housing unit would
render the FHA a “general anti-discrimination [statute], creating rights for
any discriminatory act which impacts property values—say, for generally
inadequate police protection in a certain area.” 442 Judge Higginbotham
described the court as confining itself to the statute’s terms. 443 He wrote
that the FHA must “remain[] a housing statute . . . . That the corrosive bite
of racial discrimination may soak into all facets of black lives cannot be
gainsaid, but this statute targets only housing.” 444 Thus, while section
3604(b) may be available to homeowners whose complaints deal with
discrimination in the initial purchase of their homes or their actual or
constructive eviction from their homes, section 3604(b) “does not aid
plaintiffs, whose complaint is that the value or ‘habitability’ of their houses
has decreased.”445
To be sure, the dumping site in Cox involved the regulation of an
illegal dumping site, and this Article focuses on discriminatory government
action, like the siting of a legal dumping site in a black community. The
Fifth Circuit’s response to the theories presented, however, raise troubling
questions about the reasoning that the courts may apply to legal theories
437

Id. at 741.
Id. at 746.
439
Id. at 742-43.
440
Id. at 745.
441
Id.
442
Id. at 746.
443
Id.
444
Id.
445
Id.
438
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challenging the same types of governmental decisions because of the courts’
understanding of the FHA’s reach.
Cox involved the hallmarks associated with the legacy of racial
zoning. It also arises out of a troubling, unbroken line between Dallas’s
racist land use policies, past and present. Dallas passed a racial zoning
ordinance in 1916.446 While its racial zoning was invalidated in 1927, 447 it
remained on the books even after the decision. The case includes a
neighborhood that was zoned residential, but the City still approved an
industrial land use for a site in the area. 448 The plaintiffs also alleged that
the LULU was allowed to persist in a residential area as it became
increasingly African American, and that the City failed to remedy the illegal
dumping as it had done in two white communities which faced the same
problem.449 Thus, the case presents a lack of both protective zoning and
maintenance of a LULU in a majority-black community. Yet the theory
that the plaintiffs tried to directly challenge the City’s regulation of the site
under the FHA failed.450
Fair housing litigation expert Robert Schwemm has argued that “a
claim based on a municipality’s provision of inferior services to
homeowners in a minority neighborhood would presumably be more
appropriate under § 3604(b), with a § 3604(a) claim arising in this situation
only if the discrimination became so egregious that the plaintiffs’ homes
were made ‘unavailable.’”451 Courts have generally decided against
plaintiff homeowners in cases involving the provision of municipal services
under section 3604(a).452 Section 3604(a) also may not reach local
446

See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 31, at 45; TAYLOR, supra note 333, at 169-70.
See Dallas v. Liberty Annex Corp., 19 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929), writ
dismissed w.o.j. (Nov. 20, 1929) (holding that the city’s segregation ordinance violated the
“due process of law” provisions in the state and federal constitutions and was
unenforceable).
448
While Deepwood began as predominantly white when the City annexed it, it
is not unlikely that the City made zoning decisions based on the fact that the
neighborhood’s demographics were slowly changed. Richard Rothstein describes how a
St. Louis, Missouri, planning commission would sometimes “change an area’s zoning
from residential to industrial if African American families had begun to move into it.”
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 31, at 50. Other cities, like Kansas City, Missouri, and Norfolk,
Virginia, designated African American areas in official planning documents and used this
information to make spot zoning decisions until at least 1987. See id. at 48. A spot zoning
decision would explain how the gravel pit made it into Deepwood in the first place.
449
Cox, 430 F.3d at 736-37.
450
Id. at 749-50.
451
Schwemm, supra note 379, at 750 (analyzing 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(d)(4)).
452
See id. at 751, 751 n.231 (collecting cases). Some notable cases that implicate
the failure to provide protective zoning or the disproportionate siting of undesirable land
uses include: Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass’n v. Glendening, 174 F.3d 180, 192-93
(4th Cir. 1999) (dismissing, based on Southend and other cases, black homeowners’ §
447
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government acts that make the experience of living in a neighborhood more
difficult but that do not make housing “unavailable.”453 Likewise, section
3604(a) does not reach the issue of habitability per se.454
3. Discriminatory Municipal Services
Several claims under section 3604(b) have produced favorable
results for plaintiffs challenging discrimination in municipal services. 455
While these cases suggest that discriminatory provision of municipal
services generally falls under the FHA, the issue is about the kind and
character of the services that the courts have found the FHA protects. For
purposes of understanding the legacy of racial zoning, cases involving siting
decisions for land uses that detrimentally affect the residential character of
a neighborhood have often failed. For example, in Jersey Heights
Neighborhood Association v. Glendening, the Fourth Circuit rejected a
challenge brought by several black homeowners in a Maryland community
to the siting of a new highway near their neighborhood.456 The court refused
to find that the highway was a “service” related to housing under the Act,

3604(a) claim challenging the siting of a new highway near their neighborhood because
the decision did not result in evictions or the denial of housing, and therefore did not make
housing unavailable under § 3604(a)); Lopez v. City of Dallas, No. 3:03-CV-2223-M,
2004 WL 2026804, at *2-3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2004) (dismissing, based on Southend,
black homeowners’ § 3604(a) claim of discrimination in various municipal services);
SCCIA III, 254 F. Supp. 2d 486, 500-02 (D.N.J. 2003) (dismissing, based on Southend and
other cases, § 3604(a) claim by residents of minority neighborhood against governmental
agency whose permitting of a nearby cement plant had only an indirect effect on
availability of housing in plaintiffs' neighborhood); Miller v. City of Dallas, No. Civ.A.
3898-CV-2955-D, 2002 WL 230834, at *12-13 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2002) (rejecting, based
on Southend, black homeowners' § 3604(a) claim alleging discrimination in various
municipal services).
453
See, e.g., Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 157 n.13
(3d Cir. 2002) (rejecting § 3604(a) claim by residents that the city’s decision to remove
Jewish religious symbols from its utility poles where the court reasoned that the conduct
did not make housing “unavailable” to the plaintiffs and that section 3604(a) could not be
stretched “to encompass actions that both (1) do not actually make it more difficult (as
opposed to less desirable) to obtain housing and (2) do not directly regulate or zone housing
or activities within the home” even if it may have made “their living in the Borough less
desirable”).
454
See Clifton Terrace Assocs., Ltd. v. United Techs. Corp., 929 F.2d 714, 71920 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The court in Clifton Terrace did, however, note that section 3604(a)
may extend to sewer hook-ups and certain other “essential services relating to a dwelling
. . . [that] might result in the denial of housing,” but it cannot reach beyond issues of
housing availability to those of habitability). Id.
455
See Schwemm, supra note 379, at 753, 753 n.234 (collecting cases).
456
174 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 1999).
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describing the argument as a “strained interpretation of the word.” 457 The
court then cabined in the meaning of the term: “The Fair Housing Act’s
services provision simply requires that ‘such things as garbage collection
and other services of the kind usually provided by municipalities’ not be
denied on a discriminatory basis. It does not extend to every activity having
any conceivable effect on neighborhood residents.”458
Other courts deciding section 3604(b) claims related to local
government functions not directly related to housing followed suit. For
example, in 2003, a district court rejected a claim by residents of a black
neighborhood against a governmental environmental protection agency that
authorized the operation of a cement plant nearby, finding that section
3604(b) did not “extend[] to the decision of every governmental agency that
may have an indirect impact on housing.”459 The court further determined,
“[a]lthough the [New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection]
clearly provides a number of valuable services to the citizens of the State of
New Jersey by enacting regulations and overseeing their implementation, it
does not follow that it provides specific residential services.” 460 Those
“specific residential services” would be “door-to-door ministrations such as
those provided by police departments, fire departments, or other municipal
units.”461 Likewise, a local government may also not be held liable under
section 3604(b) based on a selection of a stadium site, despite the negative
externalities that they can pose to minority communities.462
In short, discriminatory municipal services, particularly a local
government’s enforcement of its own zoning law, may be actionable as a
“service” or “privilege” under section 3604(b) if the service was directed at
the plaintiff’s actual home. 463 For the sake of the lack of protective zoning
and the disproportionate siting of LULUs, a potential plaintiff in a town
caught in the legacy of racial zoning would be unlikely to succeed under
section 3604(b) because she would be complaining about “defendants’
enforcement actions directed at other properties.”464
457

Id. at 193 (quoting Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 724 F.2d 419, 424 (4th

Cir. 1984)).
458

Id.
SCCIA III, 254 F. Supp. 2d 486, 503 (D.N.J. 2003) (quoting Jersey Heights,
174 F.3d at 193)).
460
SCCIA III, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 503.
461
Id.
462
See Laramore v. Illinois Sports Facilities Auth., 722 F. Supp. 443, 452 (N.D.
Ill. 1989)
463
See Schwemm, supra note 379, at 788, 788 n.402 (collecting cases alleging
discriminatory enforcement of land use restrictions, building codes, and other municipal
laws against Latino residents).
464
See Schwemm, supra note 379, at 789 (emphasis added).
459
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David Troutt has proposed theories that rely on “constructive
denials of opportunity” under section 804(a) and discrimination in “the
terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the
provision of services or facilities in connection therewith” under section
804(b).465 This approach, however, requires a court to follow a more
expansive version of equity, which remains an uphill battle.
4. The Power of Fair Housing Policy
While systemic fair housing litigation can lead to victories against
a specific policy or practice with segregative effects, the power of the
accumulated public and private policies that shaped racial segregation in
housing through U.S. society requires an affirmative obligation to promote
integration as a matter of public policy and private practice. 466 Thus far,
the best hope for implementing this effort is HUD’s Affirmatively
Furthering Fair Housing (AFFH) Rule.467 HUD’s regulation implementing
the obligation to “affirmatively further” fair housing in the federal FHA
provides a structure within which city leaders and stakeholders can
specifically consider the aspects of the legacy of racial zoning outlined
above and develop goals and strategies that specifically respond to them.
The AFFH provision has remained dormant for much of its history.
After the federal government proved ineffective or ambivalent at enforcing
AFFH,468 only a handful of fair housing groups took advantage of the
provision to challenge historic governmental decisions that promoted and
reinforced racial segregation. The cases held that the federal government
must take affirmative steps to remedy past discrimination. 469
In 2015, HUD promulgated a rule designed to implement the
“affirmatively further” provisions of the FHA, generally referred to as

465

See Troutt, supra note 233, at 96 (emphasis in original); see also Daniel Judt,
Stadiums
Ruin
Neighborhoods,
THE
NATION
(Sept.
3,
2015),
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/stadiums-ruin-neighborhoods/.
466
See Troutt, supra note 233, at 45.
467
See 42 U.S.C. § 3608 (2012); Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80
Fed. Reg. 42272 (July 16, 2015) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576,
903).
468
See CHRISTOPHER BONASTIA, KNOCKING ON THE DOOR: THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT'S ATTEMPT TO DESEGREGATE THE SUBURBS 102-06 (2006).
469
See Florence W. Roisman, Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing In Regional
Housing Markets: The Baltimore Public Housing Desegregation Litigation, 42 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 333, 364-65 (2007); Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 503 F. 2d 930,
931, 938-39 (7th Cir. 1974), aff’d sub nom. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976)
(ordering HUD to issue a metropolitan-wide remedy for segregation).
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“AFFH.”470 The adoption of the AFFH Rule is part of a “mild renaissance”
of the anti-segregation objectives of fair housing law.471 Prior to the
promulgation of the AFFH Rule in 2015, HUD only tentatively enforced
the AFFH obligation, if at all. 472 HUD has stated that the purpose of the
Rule is to “provide access to effective planning approach to aid those
program participants that wish to avail themselves of it in taking
meaningful actions to overcome historic patterns of segregation, promote
fair housing choice, and foster inclusive communities that are free from
discrimination.”473 The Rule offers HUD’s definition of what it means to
affirmatively furthering fair housing:
[A]ffirmatively furthering fair housing means taking
meaningful actions that, taken together, address significant
disparities in housing needs and in access to opportunity,
replacing segregated living patterns with truly integrated and
balanced living patterns, transforming racially and ethnically
concentrated areas of poverty into areas of opportunity, and
fostering and maintaining compliance with civil rights and
fair housing laws.474
The Rule “requires recipients of HUD funds to engage in and
document a data-driven, participatory, race-conscious planning process to
promote residential integration, reduce housing disparities, and increase
access to opportunity in racially or ethnically concentrated areas of
470

42 U.S.C. § 3608 (2012); Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg.
42272 (July 16, 2015) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576, 903).
471
See Troutt, supra note 233, at 8.
472
See Blake Emerson, Affirmatively Furthering Equal Protection:
Constitutional Meaning in the Administration of Fair Housing, 65 BUFF. L. REV. 163, 17172 (2017). It should be noted that, in the early years after the passage of the FHA, HUD
had a vigorous commitment to enforcing the AFFH mandate. See KEEANGA-YAMAHTTA
TAYLOR, RACE FOR PROFIT: HOW BANKS AND THE REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY UNDERMINED
BLACK HOMEOWNERSHIP 113 (2019). George Romney, who served as Secretary of HUD
during the Nixon Administration, developed Open Communities, an effort designed to
provide opportunities for low-income individuals to move to the suburbs. See id. HUD
officials saw the program as “rooted in the new legal terrain established by the Fair
Housing Act, which included the responsibility to administer programs in such a way as
to pursue residential integration.” Id. at 113-14. Nixon, however, faced intense opposition
from white suburban voters who were part of the Republican Party’s burgeoning political
base, and he resisted Romney’s efforts. See id. at 120-21. As a result, Romney resigned.
Id. at 212. After that backlash, HUD apparently tolerated the political limits to enforcing
the mandate. See id.
473
24 C.F.R. § 5.150 (2016).
474
24 C.F.R. § 5.151 (2016).
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poverty.”475 The process requires HUD grantees, including municipalities
and states, to conduct and submit to HUD an “Assessment of Fair Housing”
(AFH).476 The AFH uses data provided by HUD and local knowledge to
identify fair housing issues, including patterns of segregation, racially or
ethnically concentrated areas of poverty (R/ECAPs), and disproportionate
housing needs.477 The Rule also requires that “meaning community
participation” must inform the AFH and that cities must identify
“contributing factors” that cause the issues uncovered in the data and public
deliberation.478 Finally, HUD grantees must “[s]et goals for overcoming
the effects of contributing factors . . . .”479 Although the Rule focuses on
fair housing planning, it provides HUD with the authority to use
administrative enforcement mechanisms if grantees fail to comply,
including cutting off funding under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.480
The AFFH Rule is potentially a step in the right direction for
rethinking the meaning of fair housing more broadly.481 Indeed, it has
“become central to reviving the anti-segregation interest in fair housing.”482
The AFFH mandate in the FHA grows out of the revolution of the Civil
Rights Movement and the wave of laws that “prescrib[e] principles of
‘antisubordination’ or ‘anti-humiliation,’ which targets not only a de jure
racial caste system, but also the broader set of social institutions, practices,
and meanings that perpetuate material inequality between racial groups.” 483
The AFFH Rule thus potentially serves as an underutilized policy tool for
challenging the legacy of racist policies that followed from racial zoning
ordinances and the logic that created these ordinances. Antidiscrimination
475

Emerson, supra note 472, at 164; see also Restoring Affirmatively Furthering
Fair Housing Definitions and Certifications, 86 Fed. Reg. 30779 (June 10, 2021).
476
24 C.F.R. § 5.154 (2016).
477
24 C.F.R. § 5.154(d)(2) (2016).
478
See 24 C.F.R. §§ 5.154(d)(3), 5.158 (2016).
479
24 C.F.R. §§ 5.154(d)(4)(iii).
480
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2012); Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed.
Reg. 42,313 (July 16, 2015) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. 5, 91, 92).
481
See Emerson, supra note 472, at 167.
482
Troutt, supra note 233, at 26; see also Johnson, supra note 380, at 1193-94
(suggesting that the AFFH mandate functions as “an additional mechanism for promoting
fair housing” that “give[s] power to federal agencies to promote antidiscrimination and
integration requirements”) (emphasis added).
483
Emerson, supra note 472, at 198 (quoting Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel,
The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 (2003); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS
REVOLUTION 150 (2014)); see also Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation and Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 1331 (1988); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 327 (1987).
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law should accommodate claims arising from efforts to maintain white
spatial exclusivity.484 “Racial territoriality”—the idea that race is spatial
and that physical space can have a racial identity 485—may encompass the
racial identification of white space as well as black space. While it is clear
that federal civil rights laws should be used to block institutions that seek
to reinscribe and protect the privileged nature of white space, the corollary
for racialized black space is true. When expulsive zoning and the lack of
protective zoning conspire to reinforce the historically denigrated nature of
black space, either the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause or federal
civil rights laws should provide causes of action for advocates of these
communities to remove these inscribing features of racial denigration
directed toward majority-black communities.
The architecture of the Rule embeds an increased emphasis on
equity across various aspects of social and political life in ways that can
target land use and planning policies that inscribe black spaces
disproportionately with negative features like LULUs and little to no
protection for their residential character. Intractable inequality, which has
proven difficult to unravel even with systemic FHA cases, has led to the
rise of regional or “metropolitan equity” as a framework from which
advocates for greater opportunity can develop remedies.486 According to
David Troutt, “[m]etropolitan equity is the idea that all parts of a region are
relevant to the distribution of opportunity in any part, and that remedies for
expanding mobility can and should be assessed on an equitable basis.” 487
The AFH’s requirement that jurisdictions analyze HUD-provided
data to understand local fair housing issues is “a quintessential metropolitan
equity inquiry” that functions as an “open-ended investigation” for HUD
grantees.488 “Fair housing and metropolitan equity share much in common,
but they are not the same thing. They rest on different premises—the one
on the presence of discrimination, the other with at least its legacy
effects.”489 Metropolitan equity, however, is a “descriptive and remedial
framework,” but not necessarily a legal one. 490 The AFFH Rule, however,
appears to embrace this multidisciplinary approach in ways that connect
fair housing law to access to opportunity.

484

Boddie, supra note 12, at 403, 450, 462-63.
Id. at 406.
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See Troutt, supra note 233, at 10-11.
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Id. at 11.
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Id. at 46-47.
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Id. at 11.
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See id. at 11, 13.
485

“PIGS IN THE PARLOR”

2022]

87

5. AFFH Rule—Broadening the Meaning of Fair Housing
As David Troutt has observed, “[u]nder the Assessment Tool . . .
very little about community and regional planning is not also fair
housing.”491 Under the Rule, a HUD grantee may use focus on a broad
variety of strategies that go beyond just housing. For example, the Rule
challenges jurisdictions to focus on “strategically enhancing access to
opportunity, including through[] [t]argeted investment in neighborhood
revitalization or stabilization” and “improving community assets such as
quality schools, employment, and transportation” in addition to promoting
greater housing choice and facilitating access to quality affordable
housing.492 Both the AFH and the Guidebook also speak to equitable
development strategies across neighborhoods.493
This pivot toward metropolitan equity in fair housing law that the
AFFH Rule reflects may lead to a road that directly confronts the limits of
the current conception of the FHA’s proper scope in ways that tackle the
kinds of inequity that come from the way in which the legacies of racial
zoning deprive people of opportunity in ways that extend beyond access to
housing. “[T]he comprehensive goals of the AFFH process (racially
balanced communities of opportunity) and expanded scope (a wide variety
of institutions important to opportunity production) indicate a modernized
view of inequality that is structural and complex.” 494 Where the traditional
focus areas of fair housing litigation end, this conception of the FHA’s
AFFH mandate may pick up to fulfill the statute’s full potential, especially
in hard to reach contexts.
The goals and recommendations in HUD’s Guidebook focus on
creating housing opportunities that will have a generally positive impact on
people of color, given their demographic characteristics outside of race, and
the creation and maintenance of affordable housing and related public
services.495 These aspects of the implementation of the mandate have
491

Id. at 46 (emphasis in original).
See 24 C.F.R. § 5.150 (2016).
493
See Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing Rule Guidebook, HUD, at 12 (Dec.
31,
2015),
https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/FHEO/documents/AFFH-RuleGuidebook.pdf [hereinafter “Guidebook”] (supporting “place-based and mobility
strategies” including “[m]aking investments in segregated, high poverty neighborhoods
that improve conditions and eliminate disparities in access to opportunity between
residents of those neighborhoods and the rest of the jurisdiction and region”).
494
Troutt, supra note 233, at 47.
495
For instance, the Guidebook offers examples that include a goal which
provides:
492

[T]o increase integration and overcome the disproportionate housing
needs of a specified protected class, at least 10 percent of newly
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received much attention.496 While the availability of housing is crucial, the
AFFH Rule and HUD’s conception of the Rule’s implementation in the
Guidebook is notably even more expansive. The Rule defines fair housing
issues to include matters that extend beyond providing housing itself. The
Rule defines a “fair housing issue” broadly as “a condition in a program
participant’s geographic area of analysis that restricts fair housing choice
or access to opportunity.”497 The Rule provides several examples of these
“conditions,” and only one example directly implicates the availability of
housing: “disproportionate housing needs.”498 The other examples address
issues of equity between communities, namely “ongoing local or regional
segregation or lack of integration, racially or ethnically concentrated areas
of poverty, [and] significant disparities in access to opportunity . . . .” 499
The examples also include “evidence of discrimination or violations of civil
rights law or regulations related to housing.” 500 It does not limit the laws
at issue to the FHA; Congress has embedded the AFFH requirement in at
least three other federal statutes. 501 These statutes include the Housing and
Community Development Act, which provides funding for community
development activities beyond the construction and maintenance of
housing.502
Fair housing rights must include attention to the distribution of
public resources to residential areas, including parks, libraries, or
developed housing units in the Pacific and Huron neighborhoods will be
affordable to families with incomes at or below 50 percent of [Area
Median Income], and at least another 10 percent of newly developed
housing units in these neighborhoods will be affordable to families with
incomes between 50 and 80 percent of AMI.
Guidebook, supra note 493, at 115-16. Another goal is to “preserve 100 units of current
assisted housing . . . while investing in neighborhood schools to improve quality” in order
to address disproportionate housing needs and promote access to opportunity for members
of protected classes in gentrifying neighborhoods. Id. at 178.
496
See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 472, at 193-95.
497
24 C.F.R. § 5.152.
498
Id.
499
Id.
500
Id.
501
See Restoring Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing Definitions and
Certifications, 80 Fed. Reg. 30779, 30780 (June 10, 2021) (“Congress has repeatedly
reinforced the AFFH mandate for funding recipients, embedding within the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974, the Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable
Housing Act of 1990, and the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, the
obligation that certain HUD program participants certify, as a condition of receiving
Federal funds, that they will AFFH.”) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 5304(b)(2), 5306(d)(7)(B),
12705(b)(15), 1437C-1(d)(16)).
502
42 U.S.C. § 5302.
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educational facilities. It should certainly include attention to the tax
incentives that government provides to attract retail to these communities
as well. Public actors have the ability to shift the allocation of public
resources and influence market priorities through several mechanisms. For
example, public authorities can track levels of segregation and racial
disparities in access to resources, including employment and
transportation.503
6. Taking A Proactive Approach
Public actors also have a role to play in using their power to advance
social justice. Just as zoning law set the framework for the degradation of
black residential communities, zoning law plays a critical role in reversing
the effects of past discrimination. Throughout American history, however,
urban planners and local government officials have shown little interest in
integrating a focus on racial justice or equality into their decisions about the
development of the towns and cities they lead. 504 City planners and elected
officials went out of their way to justify racial zoning ordinances and policy
decisions that developed from relying on the boundaries that racial zoning
ordinances had established. 505 These actors, however, have an inordinate
amount of power to develop planning-based remedies that address the
wrongs that previous planning decisions authorized or encouraged. “Few
White planners have shown an immediate interest in improving the quality
of life for Blacks through environmental policy initiatives.”506 Improving
the spatial outcomes in historically black and hyper-racially segregated
communities requires urban planners in particular to change their
orientation and view of what it means to serve in this role. Scholars have
agreed that “[t]he act of public works planning is an ‘exercise of social,
economic, and political power.’”507 “[T]he role of the planner is that of
social change agent. The social change agent is an advocate for a group that
will benefit from the agent’s involvement.” 508
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Johnson, supra note 380, at 1230.
See Archer, supra note 14, at 1300–01 (detailing contexts in which the salience
of racism still shapes outcomes for people of color, including in housing, transportation
policy, school discipline policies, and the criminal justice system).
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See Robert W. Collin, Timothy Beatley & William Harris, Environmental
Racism: A Challenge to Community Development, 25 J. BLACK STUD. 354, 356 (1995).
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Id. at 359.
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Archer, supra note 14, at 1301 (quoting id. at 356) (internal alterations
omitted).
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Collin, supra note 505, at 359; see also Rober Mier, Some Observations on
Race in Planning, 60 J. AM. PLAN’G ASS’N 235, 236, 239 (1994) (emphasis omitted)
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HUD’s AFH can provide public actors and community advocates
with the necessary data to make decisions that help to remediate the effects
of the legacy of racialized zoning practices. The AFH process runs like a
guided problem-solving exercise in which communities both identify their
own specific challenges and develop their own tailored solutions. HUD has
promulgated a Guidebook to help grantees develop their Assessments of
Fair Housing.509 The Guidebook includes descriptions of “fair housing
issues” such as segregation, racially or ethnically concentrated areas of
poverty, disparities in access to opportunity, disparate housing needs, and
enforcement capacity as well as descriptions of potential “contributing
factors” related to these issues. 510 The contributing factors include
environmental health hazards, inadequate public transit, zoning restrictions,
and a lack of private investment. 511
This open-ended approach makes space for the premise that
jurisdictions and regions in the United States historically used different
tools to entrench racial segregation and disadvantage. One set of solutions
will not respond to the challenge facing every jurisdiction. This process
presents an opportunity for cities in the South to examine their communities
with a particular historical backdrop in mind that can inform more tailored
solutions. As Blake Emerson has pointed out, “[t]he Rule goes to show that
there is a wide variety of racially progressive policy that the federal
government and state and local policymakers can conduct while remaining
within the strictures of current doctrine.”512
The analysis required by the AFFH Rule provides a mechanism to
require local governments to take a more proactive approach to addressing
fair housing and community development issues. With respect to proposed
action that a government actor may take, some scholars have proposed
requiring jurisdictions to prepare “racial equity impact studies” or complete
similar audits to “unearth racial inequities before harm is inflicted on
communities of color.”513 Racial equity impact studies/statements focus on

(“Race is a ubiquitous reality that must be acknowledged . . . if [planners] do not want
simply to be the facilitators of social exclusion and economic isolation.”).
509
Guidebook, supra note 493.
510
Id. at 56-106.
511
Id. at 107-10, 157.
512
Emerson, supra note 472, at 195.
513
Archer, supra note 14, at 1321; see also William Kennedy, Gillian Sonnad &
Sharon Hing, Putting Race Back on the Table: Racial Impact Statements, 47
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 154 (2013); R.A. Lenhardt, Race Audits, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1527,
1527 (2011) (introducing race audits as a tool that “eschews a singular focus on intentional
discrimination” and instead “seeks to uncover the specific structural mechanisms that
create cumulative racial disadvantage across domains, time, and generations”).
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understanding the harm of a proposed project. 514 The AFFH provision,
however, provides a future focus. The fact-finding process of the AFH can
function as an audit of the current state of fair housing and development
issues in a community. Jurisdictions must take steps to promote fair
housing choice and residential integration, not just consider whether their
proposed actions will impede these priorities. Thus, AFFH serves to inform
public policy rather than purely create a protective mechanism.
Nonetheless, jurisdictions and advocates should use racial impact
studies/statements because they can support policy development,
implementation, and decision-making as well as combat racial
discrimination.515 Local governments have also adopted ordinances
requiring policymakers to assess the impact of a governmental decision on
racial and ethnic groups. For example, in 1989, New York City modified
its charter and adopted a requirement that assessed race to ensure that
“undesirable facilities” did not overburden certain neighborhoods.516 These
statements, however, do not necessarily come with a mandate—namely,
that policymakers must take or refrain from pursuing a proposal to the
extent it would have a disproportionately negative impact on a racial or
ethnic group.517 Consequently, their impact in shaping government action
or driving policy forward is limited.
7. Fair Housing Policy’s Limits
Despite the virtues of the AFFH Rule, it has several structural
limitations that could seriously impair its effectiveness in addressing the
legacies of racial zoning in the South. As an initial matter, the scope of
514

See Archer, supra note 14, at 1321.
Id. at 1322 (“Racial impact studies are intended to support the development
of fair and equitable governmental action by analyzing how racial and ethnic groups will
be differentially impacted by proposed governmental actions, policies, or practices.”);
Kennedy, et al., supra note 513, at 156 (“A racial impact statement can help reveal the
situatedness of different communities and help in identifying targeted strategies which
could be used to alleviate the disparities.”); Marc Mauer, Racial Impact Statements:
Changing Policies to Address Disparities, 23 CRIM. JUST. 16, 17, 20 (2009) (arguing that
racial impact statements “offer one means by which policy makers can begin to engage in
a proactive assessment of how to address” racial and ethnic disparities that result due to a
complex combination of factors).
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See Lenhardt, supra note 513, at 1553.
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Archer, supra note 14, at 1329–30 (suggesting that racial equity impact study
requirements should “require relevant agencies to take concrete steps to mitigate the
negative impacts on marginalized communities of color identified through the study
process, pursue structural changes and remedial actions necessary to advance systemic
racial equality, and make reparations for decades of past harm . . . to minimize or avoid the
enforceability problems of NEPA”) (emphasis added).
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HUD’s Guidebook in its connection of fair housing to access to public
services extends beyond the boundaries of the current case law applying the
Act to mandate equitable provision of municipal services and amenities.
Thus, it encourages jurisdictions to do what a plaintiff may not be able to
compel them to do in litigation purely relying on the core requirements
under the Act at Section 3604, as discussed above. Even as the AFFH Rule
envisions increased reach for the FHA, the Rule lacks the kind of strong
enforcement authority necessary to compel the redistribution of burdens in
land use policy—a process that is critical to reframing black space, moving
it from denigration to revitalization. From a policy standpoint, the structure
for allocating funding under the CDBG program—the largest HUD
program under which jurisdictions are required to comply with the AFFH
mandate—does not capture the kind of racist land use policies in rural and
small town communities, like many of those where de facto segregation and
disadvantage remains most entrenched in the South.
8. Weak Enforcement Mechanisms
Despite its aspirational framework, the AFFH Rule remains limited
in the way of traditional enforcement power.518 It appears that “the AFFH
rule contains everything necessary to a housing-based idea of equal access
to opportunity except a reliable enforcement mechanism.” 519 A more
rigorous administrative enforcement regime led by HUD and an
amendment to Section 3608 that included a private right of action to sue for
a violation of the AFFH mandate would be the easiest route to more
regional equity and inclusion. 520
Nonetheless, the AFFH Rule also challenges advocates to think
differently about the meaning of enforcement authority and consider nontraditional mechanisms for enforcement. The enforcement of the nondiscrimination provisions of the FHA mostly take place through
administrative and court litigation. The enforcement of the AFFH
obligation largely relies on administrative powers, including stripping a
jurisdiction of its funding through Title VI, a separate title in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Olatunde Johnson has framed this dichotomy as a
matter of the division of “private power” and “public power.” 521 Johnson
suggests that the enforcement of the AFFH mandate can create a systemic
See Troutt, supra note 233, at 14 (“Missing so far [from the AFFH rule] is the
enforcement authority that would complement its remedial thrust and make it more than
aspirational.”).
519
Id. at 49.
520
See id. at 92-93.
521
See Johnson, supra note 380, at 1224.
518
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shift away from the lackluster record of using individualized
antidiscrimination enforcement to achieve integration or remove barriers to
housing choice and toward an effort to “harness[] a broad range of federal
administrative tools including conditioned spending and formal and
informal regulation to engage states and localities to promote fair
housing.”522 This reliance on regulatory guidance, conditions on spending,
and agency action to achieve compliance with furthering access to equal
housing opportunities requires us to examine closely how well these
mechanisms actually work on the ground in the places where housing
discrimination and land use policies that have a disparate impact on people
of color may fly under the radar. These places include much of the South,
which has more rural communities than most regions of the United
States.523
9. The AFFH Rule’s Urban Bias
In the context of small towns and rural areas in the Deep South—
the context in which the legacy of racial zoning may remain the strongest
given the number of jurisdictions that actually enacted racial zoning laws
in this region—it has been argued that the AFFH Rule will not reach these
areas because HUD operates under an “urban bias” in its efforts to
implement fair housing law. 524 University of Mississippi law professor
Desiree Hensley argues that the problem starts with HUD’s unit of analysis
when it comes to the jurisdictions to which it provides funding and which
it requires to engage in a fair housing analysis.525
According to HUD’s interim final AFFH rule, “Congress has
repeatedly confirmed its view that the AFFH mandate imposes affirmative
obligations on HUD funding recipients[] [i]n three separate statutes postdating the Fair Housing Act,” including the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974 (HCDA).526 The HCDA requires covered HUD
522

Id. at 1196.
Only three of the twenty states with the largest urban populations are Southern
states (Florida, Texas, and Virginia). See, e.g., Nathaniel Rakich, How Urban Or Rural Is
Your State? And What Does That Mean For The 2020 Election?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr.
14, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-urban-or-rural-is-your-stateand-what-does-that-mean-for-the-2020-election/.
524
See, e.g., Hensley, supra note 17, at 94. Indeed, much of the fair housing
literature has an urban bias as it focuses on housing inequality in inner-city and outer-ring
urban-suburban divides, a structure that does not necessarily account for rural
communities. See, e.g., Troutt, supra note 233, at 60; Cashin, supra note 306, at 1990;
McFarlane, supra note 361, at 335.
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Hensley, supra note 17, at 94-96.
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Certifications, 86 Fed. Reg. 30779, 30781 (June 10, 2021).
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participants to certify that they will affirmatively further fair housing as a
condition for receiving funds.527 Title I provides for the CDBG.528
Congress created the CDBG program in 1974 to provide grants to
local jurisdictions to develop “viable urban communities, by providing
decent housing and a suitable living environment and expanding economic
opportunities, principally for persons of low and moderate income.” 529
HUD issues CDBG grants to units of local governments and states (and
their consortia); the former are cities in metropolitan areas with populations
of over 50,000 and urban counties with more than 200,000 people (known
as “entitlement areas”), 530 while smaller “non-entitlement” localities may
receive funds indirectly through grants made to their states or as part of a
consortium led by an entitlement area. 531 Jurisdictions can use CDBG
funds for a broad variety of activities, many of which tie into remediating
economically distressed areas of racially and ethnically concentrated areas
of poverty.532 Seventy percent of the funds go to entitlement jurisdictions
while thirty percent go to non-entitlement jurisdictions based on an
allocation formula.533 In fiscal year 2021, Congress funded CDBG at $3.45
billion, an increase of $50 million from fiscal year 2020, giving it more
grant funding than any other HUD community development program.534
527

Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. 5304(b)(2)).
See 42 U.S.C. 5301 et seq.
529
42 U.S.C. § 5301(c).
530
Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) (Entitlement), HUD,
https://www.hud.gov/hudprograms/entitlement (last visited May 29, 2022).
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Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) (Non-Entitlement) for States
and Small Cities, HUD, https://www.hud.gov/hudprograms/nonentitlement (last visited
May 29, 2022).
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The areas include, for example, “the acquisition of real property; rehabilitation
of residential and nonresidential properties; provision of public facilities and
improvements, such as water and sewer, streets, and neighborhood centers; public services;
clearance; homeownership assistance; and assistance to for-profit businesses for economic
development activities.” Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) (Entitlement),
supra note 530; Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) (Non-Entitlement) for
States and Small Cities, supra note 531.
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See Community Development Block Grants (CDBG (Entitlement)), supra note
530; Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) (Non-Entitlement) for States and
Small Cities, supra note 531.
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Michael Matthews, Support Local Development and Infrastructure Projects:
The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Program, NAT’L ASS’N OF COUNTIES
(Jan. 12, 2022), https://www.naco.org/resources/support-local-development-andinfrastructure-projects-community-development-block-grant-1
(urging
county
government officials to advocate for increasing CDBG allocations); HUD Announces
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HUD
(May
17,
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While urban cities (entitlement areas) receive HUD funding directly
from their local jurisdiction, rural areas and small towns (non-entitlement
areas) receive funds through their state. 535 The entire state is responsible
for conducting the analysis rather than the local government that will make
decisions about how to use HUD’s grants.536 This process presents both a
policy problem and an enforcement problem. From a policy standpoint,
these assessments fail to provide “granular enough information to identify
where overt discrimination or disparate impact segregation is ongoing in
small towns and rural areas.” 537 For purposes of litigation, federal
regulations require rural areas and small towns to make vague commitments
as to the steps they intend to take to comply with the AFFH mandate.538 As
a result, holding them accountable becomes very difficult for several
reasons.
First, for the time being, one of the most successful legal theories
under which private parties have had a role in enforcing the AFFH mandate
has come through the False Claims Act. In United States ex. rel AntiDiscrimination Center of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester County, the
plaintiffs alleged that the county had violated the False Claims Act by
certifying that it had met its duty to affirmatively further fair housing under
the CDBG program when it made no consideration of racial impact in the
administration of its federally assisted housing programs.539 After the
district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs,
the parties negotiated a settlement which required Westchester County to
create more than $50 million worth of affordable housing in predominantly
white areas of the county. 540 The decision was instrumental in giving
meaning to the AFFH mandate that covers the administration of housing
and urban development programs by federal agencies and their grantees.541
It is a landmark ruling in the path toward moving beyond piecemeal
antidiscirmination litigation.542 As David Troutt has observed: “At its core,
the Westchester case may be the closest thing to a private right of action
under AFFH without suing HUD.”543
With respect to non-entitlement areas, these jurisdictions fall under
a state plan, which allows them to avoid a targeted analysis of their own
communities and thus keep the certifications to generalized statements
535
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which are hard to disprove.544 Second, the indirect federal oversight also
makes it difficult for HUD to capture non-compliance and enforce AFFH
obligations directly on the relevant jurisdiction. 545 Finally, the results from
an AFH may bolster the evidence available in litigation as courts can use
statistical analyses of housing patterns to evaluate whether a jurisdiction
has complied with the AFFH mandate. 546 These rural communities in nonentitlement areas do not have to complete their own specific AFH
analysis.547 Instead, the state level grantee completes the analysis, which
can result in missing the granular ways in which racial segregation and
disparities in housing and access to opportunity continue to run rampant in
many smaller towns.548
The problem has an extensive effect. In 2016, for example, more
than fifty percent of HUD grants were allocated to small towns and rural
areas from which HUD does not require direct fair housing assessment or
planning.549 Except Virginia and Maryland, all of these states have census
tracts that are disproportionately African American. 550 Using Mississippi
as an example, Hensley suggests that under this structure, “HUD financially
supports vast swaths of the state that may continue to engage in unassessed
and unchecked behaviors and policies that are either intentionally
discriminatory or have a discriminatory effect.”551 HUD is also particularly
important in Mississippi because Mississippi is the only state in the nation
that does not have its own law prohibiting housing discrimination.552
10. Mississippi—A Case Study of Rural Communities Falling Through
the Cracks
Mississippi presents a variety of common types of non-entitlement
jurisdictions in rural areas, all of which the AFFH Rule does not necessarily
target because of the way in which HUD regulates compliance under this
framework. Batesville is the seat of a county that has African Americans
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and whites living disproportionately in different regions of the county. 553
Indianola is a majority-black town in the Mississippi Delta where whites
and blacks live literally separated by railroad tracks.554 As the white
minority population has slowly moved out, black residents have moved
across the tracks into formerly white neighborhoods.555 Yet concentrated
poverty on the opposite sides of the tracks still persists.556 Oxford is a
disproportionately white college town in which African Americans have
lived in a specific section of town since the end of the Civil War, and there
has been little encroachment into the city’s white enclaves. 557
Finally, Mississippi has one entitlement jurisdiction—Jackson, the
state capital.558 Outside of Jackson, however, are a series of towns in the
non-entitlement areas. In a state with extremely high poverty rates,
Madison, Mississippi, has a three percent poverty rate. 559 It has a
homeownership rate of nearly one hundred percent—the only census tracts
in the state that fit this description. 560 In a state with the largest percentage
of African American residents of any other U.S. state at thirty-eight percent,
Madison is about ten percent black and more than eighty-five percent
white.561 Madison has managed to maintain strong disincentives to
building multifamily housing with an ordinance that requires landlords to
place a $10,000 bond for every unit of apartment housing that they lease. 562
This ordinance, however, apparently has gone unchallenged by HUD and
does not show up in previous fair housing analyses that Mississippi has
submitted to HUD, despite the state’s likely awareness of it.563
553
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Each of these towns presents a different way in which spatial
segregation plays out in rural or small towns, particularly with the South’s
large black population and history of racial segregation. The differences in
segregation also do not necessarily show up in the analysis of census tracts.
Instead, they show up more readily in a microspatial analysis when one
views population demographics at the census block level. The relevant
HUD data covering these communities must encompass an analysis at this
level of detail. Otherwise, policymakers and officials in charge of
implementing the AFFH obligation can continue to ignore spatial patterns
of segregation or they will remain undetected to those not on the ground.564
Jurisdictions must analyze data regarding its zoning decisions,
including residential communities adjacent to industrial zones. This review
should also include areas that suffer from cumulative zoning which
disproportionately can affect minority communities given the lack of
protective zoning which they have faced. Data regarding spot zoning and
use variances from residential to industrial or commercial can also expose
discriminatory patterns. Additionally, jurisdictions can benefit from
understanding the location of industrial land uses in that community and
observing whether there is a disproportionate overlap with the racial groups
in the areas closest to or burdened by these land uses. In short, changing
the structure of regulating conditioned spending to focus more on holding
non-entitlement communities accountable and incorporating a process of
analyzing data related to the legacies of racial zoning are critical to breaking
through the intractable problem of racial segregation in the South.
11. AFFH’s Reliance on Public Decision-Making
HUD’s AFFH Rule has not relied on specific mandatory actions that
all jurisdictions or even jurisdictions with certain types of fair housing
issues must take. Instead, the AFH at the heart of the Rule is designed to
make racial discrimination visible; it is explicitly race-conscious. This
effort, however, may place the AFFH Rule at odds with “the emphasis of
current equal protection law on making race seem less conspicuous and less
visible in public policy.”565 Making racial discrimination visible is critical
564
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to facilitating the process of turning policymakers’ attention to the kinds of
interventions that address the legacies of racial zoning and encompass
place-based solutions. At the same time, highlighting the salience of race
can also result in a power struggle between marginalized groups and
communities that refuse to give up their racialized privilege.
The AFH pulls the role of public and private investment, which are
a sine qua non of placemaking, out of the shadows where private investment
masquerades as a purely market-driven process disconnected from race and
public investment is framed as an issue of political will outside of
policymakers’ control. But the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence,
which cabins in the reach of the AFFH Rule, “urges that racial inclusion,
equality, and diversity should be accomplished through indirect means that
will not be appreciated by the affected public,” even if it means that local
governments must advance equality “’behind the back of
consciousness.’”566
The drive toward what Blake Emerson has aptly called “the logic of
concealment”567 in equal protection law raises the question of from whom
does the Court suggest state actors conceal the use of race as a policy
consideration. Critical race theorists have long argued that one can achieve
greater insight in understanding the law’s impact by taking a view from the
bottom.568 Cheryl Harris argued in her seminal article, Whiteness As
Property, that “[a]ffirmative action begins the essential work of rethinking
rights, power, equality, race, and property from the perspective of those
whose access to each of these has been limited by their oppression.” 569 The
AFFH mandate enshrines the principle of affirmative action front and
center in the context of housing policy. The effort at concealing the role of
race in formulating policy apparently aims to hide it from people in a
position of privilege that supports their ignorance, namely white
Americans. Indeed, the role of race in fashioning state policy has long been
made very clear to African Americans driven into racially zoned districts in
the most undesirable areas and afforded the least amount of protection and
investment by their local government to which they paid taxes like every
566
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other resident. While the Court has sought to move the march toward
equality to the background, the role of race in public decision-making has
never occupied that space to the clear-eyed observer. The AFFH Rule
“looks to the bottom” as it seeks to heighten public participation for
historically marginalized groups in the urban planning process 570 and
“focuses on transparent, inclusive, and evidence-based race-conscious
policy.”571
The AFFH Rule lays out a process in which stakeholders and city
leaders can address these factors that reduce the livability of majority-black
communities and develop strategies for remedying these barriers as a matter
of policy. Blake Emerson has argued that the public participation
requirement “does not merely mandate race-conscious policy, but requires
a public participation process within the planning procedure that is itself
race-conscious.”572 This opportunity is particularly compelling given “the
formal requirements of the U.S. Supreme Court’s current equal protection
jurisprudence, which permits policymakers to consider racial effects in a
general way, but disfavors explicit racial classifications.”573 Instead, the
Rule’s requirement that the jurisdiction reach out to historically excluded
groups provides a unique chance for advocates to
change the political status quo away from the current
constellation of interests and power within the relevant
jurisdiction. This requirement can serve to ‘stack the deck’
to the benefit of racial minorities and other groups who
would otherwise not have an equal opportunity to influence
the decision making process, owing to inequalities of access,
resources, or the transaction costs of participation. 574
This explicit effort to “stack the deck” predictably invites a
confrontation from those that want the house of cards to come falling down.
As discussed earlier, majority-white communities have benefited from the
570
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lack of protective zoning in majority-black communities and the shifting of
undesirable land uses away from their neighborhoods toward communities
of color. These assignments have changed from overtly racist distributions
of benefits into “patterns of entitlement that have been reestablished on
nonracial terms.”575 The frustrating result, however, amounts to what
Sheryll Cashin has called “opportunity hoarding” along racial lines—a
deeply rooted sense of ownership that resists the framework that undergirds
the anti-segregation goals of the FHA: a “reli[ance] upon past constructs of
harm and liability to accurately portray and dismantle racially identifiable
barriers to opportunity today.”576 A process of taking apart and exposing
the original morally unsustainable basis for these privileges can create an
urge to resist that blocks progress.
Deborah Archer has suggested that a racial equity impact statement
requirement would provide policymakers with “access to the information
they need to identify and implement goals and strategies that promote
fairness and equity for marginalized communities” and “open up a
community-wide conversation among various stakeholders about the
reality of racial inequality in those communities and the structural
conditions that are required to advance racial equity.”577 The objective of
providing information to policymakers and facilitating conversations with
community residents relies heavily on the assumption that policymakers
make choices that disproportionately harm black communities because of a
lack of information or disconnection with community residents. It does not
necessarily take into account that policymakers often make decisions that
may harm black communities or fail to remedy past harms because they
take the path of least resistance by imposing public burdens on the
communities with the least amount of power and resources to challenge the
decisions in the political arena or the courts. The framework of relying on
dialogue and input to elevate the goals of marginalized communities (often
low-income African Americans, in the Southern context) does not engage
with the need to provide a coercive mechanism that can dislodge entrenched
privilege (often higher-income, disproportionately white homeowners).
The AFFH Rule gives those at the bottom the chance to offer a carrot, but
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there is no stick. And, as the adage goes, “you can lead a horse to water,
but you can’t make him drink.”578
VI. CONCLUSION
Advocates of racial zoning in the early twentieth century used
policy to promote white supremacy. They conceptualized blacks as
nuisances meant to be managed. As a result, they decided to apply zoning
to exclude blacks from white spaces to whatever extent they might be
allowed. Racial zoning sought to contain and separate blacks as nuisances.
After explicit racial zoning had fallen out of favor, governments zoned
commercial and industrial uses within black residential areas. These zoning
decisions reinforce the conception of blacks as nuisance. As a result, black
communities bore the brunt of the downsides of the city’s economic
development. Essentially, governments loaded nuisances on top of each
other—blacks, factories, and highways were all treated the same: “pigs in a
parlor instead of the barnyard.”579 They served the interests of whites at
certain times, but they were left sectioned off and separate from white lives
because they were hazards or inconveniences. This approach led to the
building of warehouses rather than communities—places with significant
disincentives to affordable housing.
However, just as zoning was used to construct the problem, it can
be used to remedy it. Inclusionary zoning and mixed-income housing can
provide access to affordable homes both within and outside of current
majority-black communities in the South. No longer must black residents
remain the “pigs in the parlor”; the promise of zoning in Euclid to promote
viable communities, even after decades of racist manipulation, can be a
reality.
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